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Theories of Prosecution 
Jeffrey Bellin* 
For decades, legal commentators sounded the alarm about the 
tremendous power wielded by prosecutors. Scholars went so far as to 
identify uncurbed prosecutorial discretion as the primary source of the 
criminal justice system’s many flaws. Over the past two years, 
however, the conversation shifted. With the emergence of a new wave 
of “progressive prosecutors,” scholars increasingly hail broad 
prosecutorial discretion as a promising mechanism for criminal 
justice reform. 
The abrupt shift from decrying to embracing prosecutorial power 
highlights a curious void at the center of criminal justice thought. 
There is no widely accepted normative theory of the prosecutorial role. 
As a result, prosecutors are viewed as the criminal justice system’s 
free agents, deploying the powers of their offices as they see fit to serve 
constituents, public safety, or, most broadly, the cause of justice. 
This Article uses the rapidly shifting views about prosecutors to 
explore normative theories of prosecution: What should prosecutors 
be doing? It highlights the emptiness of the current “do justice” model 
and proposes an alternative “servant-of-the-law” theory of 
prosecutorial behavior that could place real constraints on 
prosecutorial excess. It also explores ways in which a servant-of-the-
law model could, perhaps counterintuitively, contribute much-needed 
theoretical grounding to the progressive prosecution movement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars view prosecutors as “the most powerful officials in the criminal 
justice system,”1 and blame them for “[m]uch of what is wrong with American 
criminal justice.”2 But there is typically something missing from the accounts. 
An abundant literature highlights the failings of the nation’s prosecutors.3 Yet 
when it comes to setting out principles to govern how prosecutors should act, the 
commentary offers only platitudes.4 A 1935 Supreme Court opinion famously 
reminds prosecutors that it is their special duty to ensure “that justice shall be 
done.”5 After that, the consensus crumbles. Despite all the attention paid to 
prosecutors in recent years, the primary guidance on the prosecutorial function 
remains a timeworn Rorschach test.6 
 
 1. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 
(2007); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should Prosecutors 
Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 677–78 (2016) (“No serious observer disputes that 
prosecutors . . . hold most of the power in the United States criminal justice system.”). 
 2. David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 473, 474 (2016) (“Much of what is wrong with American criminal justice—its racial 
inequity, its excessive severity, its propensity for error—is increasingly blamed on prosecutors.”). For a 
critique of this critique, see Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (2019). 
 3. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071, 
1076 (2017) (coining the phrase “the Prosecutor Problem” to describe “what modern scholars claim is 
responsible for the astronomical increase in incarceration in America in the last fifty years”); Jeffrey 
Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
835, 837 (2018) (book review) (“Prosecutors are the Darth Vader of academic writing: mysterious, 
powerful and, for the most part, bad.”); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 
2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 845–46 (2004) (“[P]rosecutors have been criticized for bringing cases that are 
too weak or poorly investigated, for bringing prosecutions that are unduly harsh, and for other purported 
excesses.”); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits 
of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1329 (1993) 
(“The American prosecutor has been under nearly constant attack in the criminal procedure 
literature . . . .”). 
 4. See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 201 (1988) (“Discussions of prosecutorial duty in the literature tend to remain 
either on the level of broad platitudes or, when addressed to particular practices, to lack a coherent 
framework.”); Green & Zacharias, supra note 3, at 840 (“Commentators need to be more precise about 
what they expect of prosecutors . . . .”); infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text. 
 5. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 6. See infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text. 
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Commentators traditionally viewed the absence of concrete rules governing 
prosecutorial discretion as a blight on the criminal justice landscape, contributing 
to overly punitive and often racist criminal justice outcomes.7 Yet in recent years, 
with the ascension of unapologetically “progressive prosecutors,” commentary 
on prosecutorial power developed a new dimension.8 In 2017, for example, 
newly elected Orlando District Attorney Aramis Ayala announced that her office 
would no longer seek the death penalty.9 Over one hundred prominent law 
professors and public officials signed an open letter of support. Efforts to 
override Ayala’s decision, they wrote, threatened prosecutors’ “extremely broad 
discretion to decide when, and how, to prosecute” and “compromise[d] the 
prosecutorial independence upon which the criminal justice system depends.”10 
Around the same time, Baltimore’s chief prosecutor, Marilyn Mosby, became a 
“proxy for a nation reeling with outrage and disbelief” when she swiftly initiated 
ultimately unsuccessful criminal charges against six police officers involved in 
the death of Freddie Gray.11 In a “clip that would echo across the country,” 
Mosby explained to supporters, “I have heard your calls for ‘no justice, no 
 
 7. See Davis, supra note 1, at 17 (“[E]veryday, legal exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 
largely responsible for the tremendous injustices in our criminal justice system.”); Kenneth B. Nunn, 
The “Darden Dilemma”: Should African Americans Prosecute Crimes?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 
1492 (2000) (“Arguably, the overrepresentation of African Americans in the criminal justice system is 
due largely to the actions of prosecutors.”); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1477 (1987) (“It is, however, precisely because 
prosecutors wield so much power that the restraints which limit exercise of that power must be more 
discernable and objective.”); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. 
REV. 1521, 1572 (1981) (“[E]nvision[ing] a system in which prosecutors have far less power than they 
have today.”). 
 8. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the Mattering of Lives, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
1145, 1165 (2018) (book review) (calling on prosecutors in this “new era of prosecution” to “recast the 
pursuit of criminal justice as an antisubordination mandate” and “transform the very meaning of criminal 
justice”); Collier Meyerson, Prosecutors Keep Their Jobs by Putting People in Jail. Can They Be 
Leaders in the Fight for Criminal-Justice Reform?, NATION (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutors-keep-their-jobs-by-putting-people-in-jail-can-they-be-
leaders-in-the-fight-for-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/L472-D66S] (“Recently, a rash of 
self-proclaimed progressive prosecutors have made public moves toward reform.”); Editorial, A Wiser 
Generation of Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/opinion/a-wiser-generation-of-prosecutors.html 
[https://perma.cc/T9YK-H6ZH] (hailing rise of “[r]eformist prosecutors”).  
 9. See Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 756 (Fla. 2017) (describing controversy); see also Kyle 
Clark, New DA McCann Says Denver is Done with the Death Penalty, 9NEWS.COM (Jan. 10, 2017), 
http://www.9news.com/article/news/local/next/new-da-mccann-says-denver-is-done-with-the-death-
penalty/384633301 [https://perma.cc/5ZD6-RF8Y] (reporting on Denver’s chief prosecutor: “I don’t 
think that the state should be in the business of killing people.”). 
 10. Statement from Current or Former Judges, Prosecutors, and Law Professors Requesting 
Reversal of Decision to Remove Ayala from the Markeith Loyd Prosecution, NAT’L BLACK 
PROSECUTORS ASS’N (Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.blackprosecutors.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/342443894-FloridaSign-OnLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/FCX7-FFWP]. 
 11. Wil S. Hylton, Baltimore vs. Marilyn Mosby, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/magazine/marilyn-mosby-freddie-gray-baltimore.html 
[https://perma.cc/W7W7-ZUWY]. 
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peace!’”12 Most recently, Mosby, along with other big-city prosecutors like 
District Attorneys Larry Krasner (Philadelphia) and Cyrus Vance (Manhattan) 
announced that their offices would no longer enforce marijuana possession 
laws.13 Krasner explained the decision as “the right thing to do”; Vance’s stated 
goal was “to reduce inequality and unnecessary interactions with the criminal 
justice system.”14 Mosby highlighted the laws’ ineffectiveness: “When I ask 
myself: Is the enforcement and prosecution of marijuana possession making us 
safer as a city? [T]he answer is emphatically ‘no.’”15 
These prosecutors are not aberrations. They are prominent representatives 
of a national movement to leverage prosecutorial power to achieve criminal 
justice reform.16 A recent New York Times editorial captures the excitement, 
embracing the new wave of “state and local prosecutors who are open to 
rethinking how they do their enormously influential jobs.”17 In light of legislative 
obstacles, the Times editorialized, this “wiser generation” of prosecutors is “the 
 
 12. Id.; Page Croyder, Police Charges in Freddie Gray Case Are Incompetent at Best, BALT. 
SUN (May 5, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-freddie-gray-mosby-
20150505-story.html [https://perma.cc/8D54-KFTD] (criticizing Mosby’s decision to charge the 
officers). 
 13. PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, NEW POLICIES ANNOUNCED FEBRUARY 
15, 2018, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4412996/Krasner-Memo-March-13-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6MRD-46ZJ]; Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, District Attorney Vance to End 
the Prosecution of Marijuana Possession and Smoking Cases, (May 15, 2018), 
https://www.manhattanda.org/district-attorney-vance-to-end-the-prosecution-of-marijuana-possession-
and-smoking-cases/ [https://perma.cc/3DUE-CVL3]; Tim Prudente, Baltimore Will Stop Prosecuting 
Marijuana Possession, Mosby Announces, BALT. SUN (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-mosby-marijuana-prosecution-policy-
20190129-story.html [https://perma.cc/DV7F-LSVN].  
 14. Manhattan District Attorney’s Office, supra note 13; Brian X. McCrone, Marijuana 
Criminal Cases Dropped En Masse by Philadelphia District Attorney, NBC PHILA. (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Marijuana-Criminal-Cases-Dropped-En-Masse-by-
Philadelphia-District-Attorney-Larry-Krasner-474228023.html [https://perma.cc/4JAV-ZKBU] (“‘I 
did it because I felt it was the right thing to do,’ Krasner said. ‘We could use those resources to solve 
homicides.’”). 
 15. Prudente, supra note 13. 
 16. See Emily Bazelon & Miriam Krinsky, There’s a Wave of New Prosecutors. And They Mean 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/opinion/how-local-
prosecutors-can-reform-their-justice-systems.html [https://perma.cc/79H7-9YRZ] (“In the past two 
years, a wave of prosecutors promising less incarceration and more fairness have been elected across 
the country.”); Scott Bland, George Soros’ Quiet Overhaul of the U.S. Justice System, POLITICO (Aug. 
30, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/george-soros-criminal-justice-reform-227519 
[https://perma.cc/3GUZ-EETJ] (chronicling reform movement); Christopher Connelly, National 
Advocacy Groups Back Candidates To Challenge Local Prosecutors, NPR (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/10/598440346/national-advocacy-groups-back-candidates-to-challenge-
local-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/8FAQ-KJGS]; Henry Gass, Meet a New Breed of Prosecutor, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 17, 2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2017/0717/Meet-
a-new-breed-of-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/ZKE6-ZNHQ]; Jon Schuppe, Criminal Justice Reformers 
Aim Big by Targeting Local DA Races, NBC (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/criminal-justice-reformers-aim-big-targeting-local-da-races-n847436 [https://perma.cc/RYX9-
HGV5].  
 17. Editorial, supra note 8. 
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best chance for continued reform.”18 These developments bring renewed urgency 
to a long-unanswered question: What is the role of the American prosecutor? 
Given the centrality of prosecutors to academic writing of the past decade, the 
lack of an answer is striking. 
The curious absence of a normative theory of prosecutorial behavior is best 
explained by the runaway success of the vacuous ideal that reigns in its place. 
The conventional view of the prosecutorial role derives from an iconic passage 
in Berger v. United States.19 There, a unanimous Supreme Court rebuked a 
prosecutor who made “improper insinuations and assertions calculated to 
mislead the jury.”20 A prosecutor, the Court explained, represents “a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to 
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that 
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”21 
Although earlier statements to similar effect can be found,22 jurists, 
attorneys, and commentators seize upon the Berger passage as “the most 
authoritative and eloquent description in U.S. law of the role of the prosecutor in 
administering criminal justice.”23 The American Bar Association (ABA) adopts 
this formulation (and little else) in its Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
instructing prosecutors to act as “minister[s] of justice.”24 The largest association 
of state prosecutors, the National District Attorneys Association (NDAA), 
similarly describes the prosecutor as “an independent administrator of justice.”25 
Following these organizations’ lead, the “legal profession has left much of a 
 
 18. Id.; see also Joseph Neff, How Prosecutor Reform is Shaking Up Small DA Races, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 1, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/01/how-prosecutor-
reform-is-shaking-up-small-da-races [https://perma.cc/6CXT-RGUV] (highlighting “a new breed of 
prosecutors” elected across the country, often with “outside help” from progressive sources). 
 19. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
 20. Id. at 85. 
 21. Id. at 88. 
 22. See, e.g., Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405, 416 (1872) (“The prosecuting officer represents the 
public interest . . . . His object, like that of the court, should be simply justice . . . .”); Eric S. Fish, Against 
Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1438 (2018) (collecting other examples). 
 23. Bennett L. Gershman, “Hard Strikes and Foul Blows:” Berger v. United States 75 Years 
After, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 196 (2010); see Fish, supra note 22, at 1426 (describing Berger passage 
as the “most commonly cited” of the “canonical statements” of prosecutor’s role); Bennett L. Gershman, 
The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 317 (2001) (describing Berger as the 
“seminal case defining the prosecutor’s legal and ethical role as a minister of justice”); Michael A. 
Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
303 (2009) (“It is a truism that prosecutors are called not just to win, not just to zealously represent their 
clients, but rather to ‘seek justice.’”); Sklansky, supra note 2, at 479 (describing Berger as a “hallowed 
text[]”). A recent Westlaw search reveals that Berger’s exhortation is quoted in over one thousand 
judicial opinions and seven hundred secondary sources. 
 24. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“A prosecutor has 
the responsibility of a minister of justice . . . .”). 
 25. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS pt. 1-1.1 (3d ed. 
2009), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-NPS-3rd-Ed.-w-Revised-Commentary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D9R2-F3FN] (“The primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to seek justice . . . .”); 
Robert Rubinson, Professional Identity As Advocacy, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 7, 30 (2012) (characterizing 
the NDAA as “the preeminent national organization for state prosecutors”). 
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prosecutor’s day-to-day decisionmaking unregulated, in favor of this catch-all 
‘seek justice’ admonition.”26 
It is hard to object to Berger’s iconic description of prosecutors. No one 
can deny the appeal of justice, Merriam-Webster’s 2018 “word of the year.”27 
Federal prosecutors work in the “Department of Justice.”28 Superheroes operate 
out of the “Hall of Justice.”29 School children pledge allegiance to a nation 
dedicated to “justice for all.”30 It’s a great slogan. The problem is that 
philosophers have been trying to define “justice” for thousands of years and 
report little progress.31 John Stuart Mill considered justice to be a placeholder 
for other considerations, which explained why “so many things appear either just 
or unjust, according to the light in which they are regarded.”32 This observation 
becomes particularly salient in the grey landscapes of the criminal law, where 
justice has little uncontested content. Reformers urge prosecutors to seek justice 
by dispensing mercy,33 while their opponents wield the same slogan to endorse 
severity.34 As Abbe Smith points out: “The concept could not be more 
ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations.”35 Other commentators pile 
on: “When the ABA advises prosecutors to act as ‘ministers of justice’ or 
 
 26. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a 
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 637 (2006); see also Daniel 
S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the Post-
Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 43 (2009) (“[T]his absence of guidance has left tough ethical 
questions largely in the hands of trial prosecutors alone.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of 
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 58 (1991) (“The 
framework that the drafters have chosen consists primarily of the ‘do justice’ rule.”) 
 27. ‘Justice’ is Merriam-Webster’s 2018 Word Of The Year, NPR (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/17/677300083/justice-is-merriam-websters-2018-word-of-the-year 
[https://perma.cc/T5SX-WPUW]; MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S WORD OF THE YEAR 2018 (2018), 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/word-of-the-year-2018-justice 
[https://perma.cc/G5QW-TUN8] (noting that despite a lack of clarity about its content, “justice has been 
on the minds of many people in 2018”). 
 28. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ [https://perma.cc/4V2Y-AL7Y]. 
 29. See Hall of Justice (comics), WIKIPEDIA (Sept. 20, 2019), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hall_of_Justice_(comics) [https://perma.cc/26NR-AZA8] (“The Hall of 
Justice . . . is a fictional headquarters appearing in American comic books published by DC Comics. 
The Hall of Justice serves as a headquarters for the Justice League.”). 
 30. The Pledge of Allegiance, USHISTORY, http://www.ushistory.org/documents/pledge.htm 
[https://perma.cc/FX7C-F457]. 
 31. See generally OTTO A. BIRD, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1967) (collecting commentary). 
 32. J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 99 (Roger Crisp ed., 1998). 
 33. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration, 44 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1081 (2016) (arguing that the prosecutor’s duty to do justice “could be fulfilled 
by working to reduce mass incarceration through the expanded use of diversion and clemency 
programs”). 
 34. See, e.g., Nat’l Dist. Attorney’s Ass’n, Message from the President: A Sense of Who We 
Are, 34 THE PROSECUTOR 5, 5 (Sept./Oct. 2000) (explaining that a prosecutor’s responsibility “to 
accomplish justice” is “commonly understood” as a directive “to zealously pursue a conviction and then 
to seek the most severe sentence allowed by law”). 
 35. Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 355, 377 (2001). 
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‘administrators of justice,’ it is using juris-babble that is practically meaningless 
to prosecutors and to the ABA itself.”36 
Scholars traditionally sought to temper prosecutors’ broad discretion to “do 
justice” through calls for regulation. In fact, the scarcity of rules governing 
prosecutorial decisions is a central criminal justice lament.37 Commentators 
often cite a lack of “political will” to regulate these powerful actors,38 but 
disagreement about what prosecutorial regulations should say is an equally 
compelling explanation. As David Sklansky wryly points out, “[u]nless they are 
co-authors, no two scholars ever propose the same metric for prosecutorial 
effectiveness.”39 
Most entries in the academic literature about prosecutors fit comfortably 
within a familiar debate between rules and standards. Some commentators seek 
to rein in prosecutorial discretion with strict rules.40 Others disagree, contending 
that the multifaceted and fact-bound prosecutorial function requires malleable 
standards.41 There is a lively derivative discussion about whether new rules (or 
standards) should be operationalized through judicial oversight, legislative 
action, ethics boards, or internal guidelines.42 These are important questions. A 
 
 36. Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor As Minister of Justice and Administrator 
of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1301 (1996). 
 37. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 962 (2009) (“Many, if not most, other government actors enjoy less power yet are 
subject to far more regulation than prosecutors are.”); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (1987) (“Few officials can so affect 
the lives of others as can prosecutors. Yet few operate in a vacuum so devoid of externally enforceable 
constraints.”). 
 38. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
461, 462 (2017) (pointing to prosecutors’ “political clout” as an obstacle to reform); Niki Kuckes, The 
State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 433 
(2009) (criticizing “the ABA’s seeming lack of political will to tackle prosecutorial ethics”); Nirej 
Sekhon, The Pedagogical Prosecutor, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 45 (2014) (decrying “absence of 
political will to regulate prosecutors”). 
 39. See Sklansky, supra note 2, at 516. 
 40. See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 
1417 (2010) (“[A]cademic solutions to the problems of prosecutorial discretion came in two forms: the 
promulgation of internal office guidelines to control prosecutorial decision-making and the development 
of external limitations through restrictive legislation or heightened judicial review.”); Robert P. 
Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to 
“Do Justice,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2007) (emphasizing “the need for concrete rules”). 
 41. See Bresler, supra note 36, at 1305 (suggesting that rule makers should “[s]tick with the 
mission for prosecutors — to seek justice” because “[i]t probably cannot be described more 
eloquently”); Cassidy, supra note 26, at 640 (“Any attempt to regulate how prosecutors should ‘act’ in 
certain highly contextualized and nuanced situations by developing more specific normative rules is 
unworkable.”); Nat’l Dist. Attorney’s Ass’n, supra note 34, at 6 (“A subjective sense of justice is 
fundamental to a good prosecutor.”). 
 42. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 210-11 (2017) (suggesting legislative plea bargaining guidelines); Bibas, supra 
note 37 (“While many scholars discuss prosecutorial discretion as a problem, most favor external 
regulation of prosecutors by other institutions.”); Luna & Wade, supra note 40, at 1417 (summarizing 
the debate between proponents of external control and supporters of internal guidelines); Medwed, supra 
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central contention of this Article, however, is that all sides of the debate skip an 
essential step. Whether we think prosecutors should be governed by rules or 
standards, and regardless of where we think those commands should originate, 
we must begin with a normative principle. That principle could either generate 
standards to govern prosecutorial discretion, or it could provide a starting point 
from which to derive enforceable rules. Right now, the starting point (“justice”) 
is an analytical dead end. It offers neither a meaningful standard to govern 
prosecutors, nor a useful guideline for generating specific rules. This core 
theoretical failing, more than any other factor, explains why academics, judges, 
and practitioners have made so little progress articulating concrete guidance for 
prosecutorial behavior.43 
The problems go beyond accountability. Without a clear consensus about 
what to expect of prosecutors, legislators struggle to maintain the appropriate 
balance in the criminal law. Prosecutor offices are populated by a wide variety 
of attorneys, over twenty-five thousand of them,44 all doing their own justice 
thing.45 Even individual prosecutors may oscillate in their assessment of what 
approach best serves justice, depending on the suspected crime or characteristics 
of the offender. If each prosecutor pursues justice as they see it, the same law 
will be too lenient in one county and too severe in another.46 Capital punishment 
presents the most extreme example, with the likelihood of a death sentence 
 
note 26, at 43–44 ( “Some commentators press for more stringent rules . . . ; others recommend increased 
training for prosecutors in rendering ethical decisions; and still others suggest . . . ‘a renewed focus’ on 
virtuous conduct.”); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A 
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (proposing stronger 
ethics regulation). 
 43. Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 307 (2001) 
(“Discussions of prosecutorial discretion . . . show much confusion about what [good judgment] is, and 
what mix of moral and legal reasoning enhances it.”); M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove, Performance 
Measures and Accountability, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 91, 93 (John 
L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008) (“A central problem in the attempt to define 
performance measures in prosecution is the lack of a clear definition of prosecutorial goals and 
objectives.”); Sklansky, supra note 2, at 480 (“[T]he absence of coherent aspirations may go a long way 
toward explaining the dearth of meaningful rules.”). 
 44. Steve W. Perry & Duren Banks, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2007 – Statistical Tables, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 2 (DEC. 2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6GNZ-4RRU] (“The nearly 25,000 FTE assistant prosecutors employed in 2007 
represented a 7% increase from the number reported in 2001 . . . .”). 
 45. See Roy B. Flemming, The Political Styles and Organizational Strategies of American 
Prosecutors: Examples from Nine Courthouse Communities, 12 L. & POL’Y 25 (1990) (chronicling 
varying approaches of chief prosecutors). 
 46. See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The 
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1344 
(1993) (“[T]wo prosecutorial offices in the same state will treat the possession of a small amount of 
cocaine, a first time property offense, or drunk driving differently.”). 
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depending as much on the prosecutor overseeing the case as the characteristics 
of the crime.47 
There is, then, a strong case for developing a normative theory of the 
prosecutorial role. But what? There are numerous justice themes that prosecutors 
invoke in the course of their duties: public safety (“tough justice”), serving 
constituents (“popular justice”), and, most recently, ending mass incarceration 
(“social justice”).48 But these rhetorical appeals are typically too indeterminate 
to generate concrete guidance for prosecutors deciding whether to initiate and 
how to pursue specific cases.49 The law is the most likely place to look for this 
kind of guidance—and prosecutors sometimes invoke their adherence to the law 
to explain unpopular decisions.50 Yet scholars vigorously resist such an 
approach, urging prosecutors to exercise their discretion when necessary to 
sidestep the law’s commands.51 Closely tying prosecutorial discretion to 
substantive law, they contend, will result in wooden formalism and needless 
severity.52 These are all good points. But they undergird a hard bargain. Our long 
experiment with justice as the prosecutorial touchstone has not produced an 
abundance of leniency or, in the eyes of many commentators, justice. And given 
the widely recognized dangers of unbridled prosecutorial discretion, it seems 
worthwhile to explore alternatives. 
This Article explores the possibility of using existing legal rules to 
construct a coherent normative theory of prosecution—and primarily state and 
 
 47. See Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial 
Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 360 (2009) (highlighting “large 
geographic disparities in the rates of . . . death penalty prosecutions and convictions”); Adam M. 
Gershowitz, Pay Now, Execute Later: Why Counties Should Be Required to Post a Bond to Seek the 
Death Penalty, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 861, 862–63 (2007) (noting that while most Texas counties hadn’t 
had a death penalty prosecution in decades, Harris County prosecutors “sought the death penalty more 
than a dozen times per year,” a pattern repeated in Philadelphia, Cook County, and “throughout the 
country”). 
 48. See Connelly, supra note 16 (“social justice”). 
 49. See infra Part II. 
 50. See, e.g., Sarah Fearing, ‘Oath to Uphold the Law’: Historic Triangle Prosecutors Plan No 
Change in Handling Marijuana Cases, WY DAILY (Jan. 16, 2019), https://wydaily.com/local-
news/2019/01/16/oath-to-uphold-the-law-historic-triangle-prosecutors-plan-no-change-in-handling-
marijuana-cases/ [https://perma.cc/9E8T-TNQ5] (quoting prosecutors’ explanation for why they would 
continue to prosecute marijuana cases); Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Kamala 
D. Harris Issues Statement on Appeal of Court Ruling on California’s Death Penalty (Aug. 21, 2014), 
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-issues-statement-appeal-
court-ruling-california [https://perma.cc/SZC3-9L5V] (explaining decision to defend death penalty 
law).  
 51. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not 
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1665 (2010) (describing such an approach as suitable only for 
“an imaginary state of affairs that is almost wholly contrary to the qualities that typify modern American 
criminal justice”); Fish, supra note 22, at 1423 (“[T]he American system gives prosecutors too much 
discretion for them to act as morally neutral bureaucrats at every stage of the criminal justice process.”). 
 52. See, e.g., Barbara McQuade, Smart on Crime Charging Policy Provides Roadmap for More 
Effective Criminal Justice Strategy, 30 FED. SENT’G. REP. 207, 208 (2018) (critiquing policy of “strict 
application of the statute”); Bowers, supra note 51; Fish, supra note 22, at 1423. 
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local prosecution, the locus of American criminal law.53 It crafts a “servant-of-
the-law” model of prosecution that takes its name from an undeveloped intuition 
expressed in the same Supreme Court opinion that tasks prosecutors with 
ensuring “that justice shall be done.” There, the Court also emphasized that the 
prosecutor is “in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law.”54 
Parallels can be drawn to the perception of prosecutors in continental Europe, 
although those legal systems are so distinct that isolated comparisons of the 
prosecutorial function tend to obscure rather than clarify.55 The Article retains a 
domestic focus, explaining how a servant-of-the-law orientation would change 
American prosecutorial behavior. In so doing, it highlights potential benefits for 
our criminal justice system of shifting the dominant conception of the 
prosecutorial role from an “advocate for justice”56 to a “servant of the law.” 
Perhaps the greatest benefit is determinacy. By stripping away any pretense that 
prosecutors possess sweeping responsibility for justice, a servant-of-the-law 
model lays the groundwork for both overarching principles and concrete 
guidance for how prosecutors best serve the law in specific situations.57 
Serving the law is a clearer assignment than seeking justice. But it is by no 
means easy. Prosecutors will always be torn by competing tensions, as is the law. 
This tension could lead to an equanimity of purpose rather than the adversarial 
mindset at the root of modern prosecutorial excess.58 The law criminalizes 
certain conduct and sets penalty ranges upon conviction. But the law also dictates 
a process by which convictions must be obtained, including a heavy burden of 
 
 53. See Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political 
Dynamics and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 453 (2009) (“Criminal law is 
overwhelmingly state law . . . .”); Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-
Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 7 (2012) (“The action in criminal law has always 
been, and continues to be, at the state and local levels.”). 
 54. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (setting out the 
executive’s constitutional duty to ensure the laws are “faithfully executed”); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 
416 U.S. 637, 648–49 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The function of the prosecutor . . . is to vindicate 
the right of people as expressed in the laws and give those accused of crime a fair trial.”); Robert H. 
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 6 (1940) (“[T]he citizen’s safety 
lies in the prosecutor who . . . serves the law and not factional purposes . . . .”).  
 55. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 194 
(1969) (commenting favorably on the German prosecution model); Sklansky, supra note 2, at 493–94 
(discussing traditional differences between American and European prosecutors, but noting modern 
convergence); Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Constitutionality of Negotiated 
Criminal Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. 81, 101–02 (2014) (discussing constraints on 
German prosecutors and implications for plea bargaining).  
 56. United States v. Wilson, 578 F.2d 67, 71 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The prosecutor must be an 
advocate for Justice.”) 
 57. See infra Part II. 
 58. See Wilson, 578 F.2d at 71 (“Caught up in the adversary process and the emotional 
atmosphere of trial combat, prosecutors too often pursue strategies with a singular determination rather 
than with a careful deliberation.”); Medwed, supra note 26, at 36 (emphasizing that the “image of the 
prosecutor as carnivorous aggressor in the adversarial den of the criminal courts is alive and well”); 
Sklansky, supra note 2; Bellin, supra note 2.  
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proof.59 The law guarantees criminal defendants a right to counsel and asks 
neutral factfinders to resolve disputes.60 A prosecutor viewing this whole fabric 
as “the law” that must be served would be indifferent to wins and losses. Such a 
prosecutor succeeds when a jury convicts; succeeds when the jury acquits; and 
succeeds when dismissing a case due to insufficient evidence or an unlawful 
search or interrogation. As the Supreme Court explained in another context: “The 
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free.”61 A prosecutor 
with a professional identity as a servant of the law would find satisfaction in that 
result. 
This understanding of the prosecutor as a servant of the law, rather than an 
advocate for justice, would clarify and, in some areas, transform the traditional 
conception of the prosecutor’s role. Importantly, this reconceptualization might 
be accepted (or spurned) across the political spectrum because it does not fit 
neatly into either “side” of the criminal justice debate. It will nudge prosecutors 
toward severity when the background law is severe and towards leniency when 
the background law is lenient. It could make prosecutors less adversarial and 
more cooperative with defense counsel and judges. At its core, this 
reconceptualization narrows the rhetorical scope of the prosecutorial function, 
placing the focus on other actors, and ultimately the system itself, to ensure that 
justice is done. 
Importantly, a prosecutor who embraces the servant-of-the-law model 
would not robotically enforce every criminal statute in every case. Most 
obviously, the prosecutor would decline to prosecute cases with insufficient 
evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt.62 This would include cases that depend 
on police officers with credibility problems, jailhouse informants, coerced 
confessions, flawed identification procedures, or questionable forensic science.63 
The servant-of-the-law prosecutor would also preference defendant-protective 
state and federal constitutional provisions over the mechanical enforcement of 
criminal statutes. Thus, the prosecutor would decline to trigger bail conditions, 
charges, or sentencing enhancements that would violate constitutional provisions 
such as the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality principle, or its prohibition of 
 
 59. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979) (describing the “constitutional necessity 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 60. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing criminal defendants facing incarceration the 
right to counsel and trial by an impartial jury). 
 61. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). 
 62. See infra Part I.A. 
 63. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011) (chronicling causes of convictions of innocent defendants); Justin 
George & Eli Hager, One Way to Deal With Cops Who Lie? Blacklist Them, Some DAs Say, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/01/17/one-way-to-deal-with-cops-
who-lie-blacklist-them-some-das-say [https://perma.cc/PT7L-9H2J] (reporting on prosecutors’ 
decisions to decline cases that depend on police officers with credibility problems). 
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excessive bail or fines.64 The prosecutor would also rework plea practices to 
ensure that defendants are not coerced to waive their Sixth Amendment right to 
a jury trial.65 
Perhaps most significantly, in light of the weighty due process and 
discovery requirements that attach to even the most petty criminal case, servant-
of-the-law prosecutors would freely dismiss minor cases in response to resource 
constraints.66 For example, in an age of police body cameras,67 even the smallest 
case requires a prosecutor to gather and review the body camera footage from 
officers who responded to the incident and interacted with the defendant or 
victim.68 Prosecutors who cannot satisfy the legal obligations attendant to every 
case on their docket must dismiss cases until they can.69 Given the breadth of 
American criminal laws, all prosecutors decline to pursue some offenses to 
preserve resources for more consequential prosecutions. Servant-of-the-law 
prosecutors, keenly aware of the legal obligations that inhere in every 
prosecution, would be no exception. 
 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (“The 
Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains a ‘narrow proportionality 
principle’ . . . .”). 
 65. U.S. CONST. amend VI (protecting the “right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury”). 
 66. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose all exculpatory 
information held by government); State v. Crawford, 371 P.3d 381, 388 (Mont. 2016) (explaining that 
Brady’s rule applies “[i]n all criminal cases”). 
 67. See Jeffrey Bellin & Shevarma Pemberton, Policing the Admissibility of Body Camera 
Evidence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1425, 1429–32 (2019) (chronicling rapid spread of body cameras). 
 68. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (requiring disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence in the 
possession of the government); Mark Bowes, Chesterfield Prosecutors Plan to Stop Handling 
Misdemeanor Criminal Cases, Traffic Offenses Starting May 1 Because of Workload, RICHMOND 
TIMES-DISPATCH (Feb. 21, 2018), http://www.richmond.com/news/local/crime/chesterfield-
prosecutors-plan-to-stop-handling-misdemeanor-criminal-cases-traffic/article_a06b1fca-45e1-5eeb-
a071-3fd4900b4117.html [https://perma.cc/CWL4-YKFD] (describing a local prosecutor’s decision to 
stop prosecuting misdemeanor offenses, in part, due to their inability to fulfill an obligation to review 
police body camera footage); Kimberly Kindy, Some U.S. Police Departments Dump Body-Camera 
Programs Amid High Costs, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/some-us-police-departments-dump-body-camera-
programs-amid-high-costs/2019/01/21/991f0e66-03ad-11e9-b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/GL8K-AF8D] (“Prosecutors, too, are struggling to keep up with the added workload 
and cost of body-camera footage.”); Kim Ogg, For Harris County, More Prosecutors Means More 
Justice, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/For-
Harris-County-more-prosecutors-means-more-13602759.php [https://perma.cc/WE6R-4EFQ] 
(explaining that prosecutor’s task now includes “gathering and reviewing a much greater amount of 
evidence,” including “body camera footage from every officer at a scene”). Prosecutors could also 
arguably fulfill Brady obligations by disclosing the material without review, although doing so would 
raise prosecutorial competency and privacy concerns. See Jenia I. Turner, Managing Digital Discovery 
in Criminal Cases, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 237 (2019). 
 69. Cf. Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem of Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads, A Response to Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger, 106 NW. U.L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 143, 148 (2011) (“[E]specially in misdemeanor cases, some amount of measured discretion 
is not just permissible, but essential.”). 
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Finally, in some cases, the law itself dictates that prosecutors make choices 
without guidance, such as California’s “wobbler” offenses: identical offenses 
that can be charged as felonies or misdemeanors at the prosecutors’ discretion.70 
A prosecutor cannot faithfully carry out a legislative command that has no 
substance. Consequently, servant-of-the-law prosecutors would default to the 
less severe option. This prosecutorial-discretion version of the rule of lenity 
would incentivize legislators to eschew laws that rely on prosecutorial intuition 
rather than statutory guidance.71 
A servant-of-the-law model will not resolve all prosecutorial choices, but 
it would provide a default position for the American prosecutor, a much-needed 
starting point for crafting nuanced rules and guidance. In light of the complexity 
of American criminal justice, deviations from the default would be expected. 
However, these deviations would be recognizable and thus more likely to be 
accompanied by transparent and consistent explanations. 
With the beginnings of a concrete normative theory of prosecutorial 
behavior in hand, the question becomes whether such a theory is preferable to 
the malleability of the “do justice” status quo. A shift in orientation may prove 
unpalatable to both prosecutors who prefer the freedom to do “what is right” and 
reformers inspired by prosecutors’ potential power to unilaterally disarm the 
criminal justice system. But over the long term, more narrowly channeling the 
power of prosecutors could be preferable to continued expansion. And many (if 
not most) of the goals of the prosecutor-driven criminal justice reform movement 
could be advanced by reorienting prosecutors as less adversarial servants of the 
law. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I fleshes out the problems of the 
“do justice” status quo. Part II takes on the practicality question: Is it possible to 
craft a normative theory of the prosecutor that places concrete limits on 
prosecutorial discretion? It constructs a servant-of-the-law model of prosecution 
and illustrates the model’s application to the most important prosecutorial 
decisions. Part III addresses desirability: Is such a theory preferable to the “do 
justice” status quo? Finally, Part IV considers the degree to which a servant-of-
the-law theory could complement rather than clash with the progressive 
prosecution movement. 
 
 70. See Davis v. Mun. Court, 757 P.2d 11, 21 n.9 (Cal. 1988) (discussing judicial authority to 
reduce “wobbler[s]” charged as felonies to misdemeanors at sentencing); Manduley v. Superior Court, 
104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140, 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (Nares, J., dissenting) (noting prosecutors’ “unbridled 
discretion to charge a wobbler as a felony or misdemeanor . . . without any statutory criteria or 
standards”). 
 71. See infra Part II.B. 
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I. 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH “DOING JUSTICE”? 
The popularity of justice as a guiding prosecutorial principle is no fluke. 
Like freedom, democracy, and apple pie, justice resonates with the American 
public. Not only does everybody love justice, but the term is sufficiently flexible 
to capture every criminal law related intuition. Justice serves as a ready 
placeholder for a multitude of other values (fairness, proportionality, retribution, 
mercy), providing a rhetorical roadmap to support whatever action a prosecutor 
selects. In the hands of the right prosecutor, this freedom can be used for 
beneficial purposes, particularly when other actors, such as police, legislators, 
juries, and judges, fail to do justice. 
Prosecutors don’t spend a lot of time defining “justice,”72 but their few 
efforts to do so hint at the flaws in relying on the term as the prosecutorial 
touchstone. It covers everything and therefore demands nothing. The NDAA’s 
National Prosecution Standards explain that the responsibility to seek justice 
“includes, but is not limited to, ensuring that the guilty are held accountable, that 
the innocent are protected from unwarranted harm, and that the rights of all 
participants, particularly victims of crime, are respected.”73 Reflecting a similar 
perspective, one prominent prosecutor writes, “[w]hen we decide to prosecute, it 
is because we decide that this is how justice will be done.”74 If the defendant 
resists conviction, this prosecutor explains: “[T]he prosecutor becomes the most 
zealous champion of justice you can imagine. He is then a full-fledged fighting 
advocate; and he should be . . . . His job is now to fight fairly and firmly with all 
his might to see that truth and justice prevail.”75 This ambiguous zealotry is both 
admirable and a recipe for disaster. The villainous prosecutors who haunt legal 
commentary push the boundaries of criminal law, discount exculpatory 
information, and reflexively champion harsh punishment as a response to 
crime.76 Yet, these prosecutors likely embrace the “do justice” mantra just as 
 
 72. Brian Forst, Prosecution Policy and Errors of Justice, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE 
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 51, 52 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008) 
(“Prosecutors rarely articulate a rationale for determining how these choices are made.”). 
 73. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, ¶ 1-1.1. 
 74. Whitney North Seymour, Jr., Why Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 REC. ASS’N B. 
CITY N.Y. 302, 312 (1956). 
 75. Id. at 313; see also MARK BAKER, D.A.: PROSECUTORS IN THEIR OWN WORDS 52 (1999) 
(“Prosecutors believe they are doing the right thing. . . . You’re completely sure that what you’re doing 
is the right thing all the time . . . .”); John Cannizzaro, Prosecutorial Ethics: New Insights After 75 Years 
of Jurisprudence, THE PROSECUTOR FEATURE, Apr./May/June 2011, at 20, 29 (explaining that 
prosecutors’ special duty is “to do the right thing”); Amy Weirich, The Changing Role of the District 
Attorney, DAILY MEMPHIAN (Dec. 7, 2018), https://dailymemphian.com/article/1622/The-changing-
role-of-the-district-attorney [https://perma.cc/N8FR-647T] (“As I tell our new assistant district attorneys 
at orientation, our job is to do the right thing every day for the right reason.”).  
 76. See MARK GODSEY, BLIND INJUSTICE: A FORMER PROSECUTOR EXPOSES THE 
PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 21 (2017) (emphasizing the aggressive 
mindset of prosecutors as a critical failing of criminal justice); Fish, supra note 22, at 1446 (emphasizing 
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warmly as their many critics. The two sides merely disagree about what justice 
means.77 As a result, continually shouting “do justice” at prosecutors is more 
than an exercise in futility. It exacerbates the problems it is supposed to address. 
Prosecutors’ critics embrace the “do justice” command because it provides 
a rhetorical benchmark against which they can always find prosecutors’ 
decisions lacking.78 Judges, too, frequently invoke the slogan to criticize 
prosecutorial failings of various stripes.79 Legislatures point to the prosecutors’ 
duty to “do justice” to ease worries about the enforcement of overbroad laws.80 
In all of these applications, the malleability of the “do justice” command is its 
greatest strength. 
In practice, prosecutors rely on the freedom that “justice” provides to 
leapfrog among distinct rationales for challenged behavior. For example, 
prosecutors frequently invoke the need to ensure public safety.81 This “tough 
justice” rhetoric can support severely punishing particular defendants to advance 
instrumental crime-prevention goals. Most famously, federal prosecutors sent Al 
Capone, Chicago’s “leading mobster,” to prison on tax charges when they could 
not win convictions for his more notorious conduct.82 In modern times, federal 
prosecutors tout their efforts to obtain severe sentences for gun possession as 
 
that “prosecutors’ aggressiveness has severe consequences”); Bellin, supra note 2; Sklansky, supra note 
2.  
 77. See Jean G. Sturtridge, The Trial Prosecutor and Ethics, in DOING JUSTICE: A 
PROSECUTOR’S GUIDE TO ETHICS AND CIVIL LIABILITY 83, 83 (Ronald H. Clark ed., 2002) 
(highlighting the “win-at-any-cost” prosecutors “who zealously represent society’s interest with a deeply 
rooted conviction that their cause is just” as one of the most problematic in the office); cf. Thompson v. 
Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1075 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (“The majority rightly says 
that the prosecutor must seek above all to do justice, but seems confused about what justice is.”); United 
States v. Wilson, 578 F.2d 67, 71–72 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Justice includes the acquittal of the innocent, but 
Justice also includes the conviction of the guilty.”). 
 78. See Josie Duffy Rice, Cyrus Vance and the Myth of the Progressive Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/opinion/cy-vance-progressive-prosecutor.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q6R4-VXKW] (criticizing prosecutors who claim to be reformers as insufficiently 
progressive). 
 79. State v. Rivera, 99 A.3d 847, 859-60 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2014) (criticizing a prosecutor for 
getting into the jury box during a witness’ testimony as “at best, a distracting antic inconsistent with the 
seriousness of the prosecutor’s obligation to do justice”); Watters v. State, 313 P.3d 243, 248 (Nev. 
2013) (criticizing a prosecutor’s use of a power point slide that included the defendant’s picture and the 
word “guilty” as conflicting with a prosecutor’s obligation to “seek justice”). 
 80. See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an 
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 62 (2003) (“[L]egislators can blame prosecutors 
if they seek to charge individuals under an overinclusive law.”). 
 81. See Leon Neyfakh, How to Run Against a Tough-on-Crime DA—and Win, SLATE (Nov. 12, 
2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/11/district_attorneys_scott_colom_prove
s_you_can_run_against_a_tough_on_crime.html [https://perma.cc/6PC9-MCTJ] (quoting prosecutor 
Scott Colum: “[E]ven if people don’t know exactly what [prosecutors] do, they know that they’re 
responsible for public safety”).  
 82. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the 
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583 (2005). 
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part of an effort to reduce violence in specific regions83 and nationwide.84 New 
York City prosecutors use an automated “arrest alert system” to “incapacitate 
high priority offenders with higher bail or more severe incarceration 
sentences.”85 This results, they say, “in increased prosecutorial effectiveness and 
enhanced public safety.”86 
The progressive prosecution movement centers new rhetorical tools, 
including a “populist justice” approach that attempts to mold discretionary 
decisions to accord with constituent preferences.87 For example, one prominent 
reform campaign includes the exhortation: “What the public wants to have 
happen is what the District Attorney should be doing.”88 The populist prosecutor 
can justify certain discretionary decisions, such as declining to invoke locally 
unpopular laws, as channeling the will of the voters. Another progressive variant 
seeks social justice, by counteracting a system perceived as overly punitive and 
racist, and vigorously prosecuting police officers who violate the law.89 
All of the above theories of prosecution fit neatly under a justice rubric. In 
fact, the same prosecutor can invoke each of the above-described theories in 
different (or the same) circumstances. For example, when Philadelphia District 
Attorney Krasner announced the dismissal of marijuana cases, he invoked both 
social justice—“I felt it was the right thing to do”—and public safety: “We could 
use those resources to solve homicides.”90 Widely hailed progressive prosecutors 
like Kim Foxx similarly center the importance of public safety to their role.91 
 
 83. See Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement 
Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 379 (2001) (summarizing program in Virginia). 
 84. Ali Watkins, In Fight Against Violent Crime, Justice Dept. Targets Low-Level Gun 
Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/07/us/politics/jeff-sessions-
gun-charges.html [https://perma.cc/3WCT-MCPW]. 
 85. JENNIFER A. TALLON ET AL., THE INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN PROSECUTION MODEL, CTR. 
FOR COURT INNOVATION 23 (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/IDPM_Research_Report_FINAL.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/R2Y8-F8KU]. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 11 (“I have heard your calls for ‘no justice, no peace!’”). 
 88. Brooklyn Defender Services, Power of Prosecutors, YOUTUBE (Sep. 10, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrgvlx7MnqA [https://perma.cc/ET5M-6TSG] (“What the public 
wants to have happen is what the District Attorney should be doing.”); see also KATHERINE K. MOY ET 
AL., RATE MY DISTRICT ATTORNEY: TOWARDS A SCORECARD FOR PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES 4 (2018) 
(proposing a mechanism for rating prosecutor offices that would help reveal “whether a prosecutors’ 
office has effectively pursued the electorate’s policy priorities”). 
 89. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1465, 1508 (2002) 
(proposing “to recast the professional community of prosecutors and, in so doing, reinvigorate[] the idea 
of prosecuting for social justice”); Bazelon & Krinsky, supra note 16 (“In the past two years, a wave of 
prosecutors promising less incarceration and more fairness have been elected across the country.”) 
 90. Brian X. McCrone, Marijuana Criminal Cases Dropped En Masse by Philadelphia District 
Attorney, NBC PHILA. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Marijuana-
Criminal-Cases-Dropped-En-Masse-by-Philadelphia-District-Attorney-Larry-Krasner-
474228023.html [https://perma.cc/8VQ7-R6WL]. 
 91. See Megan Crepeau, After Momentous Week, Prosecutor Kim Foxx Says ‘We Have To Right 
Wrongs,’ CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 20, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-
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Foxx instructs “her prosecutors to focus less on narrower legal points” and more 
on the big picture: “[D]etermining the fairest outcome for each case.”92 But Foxx 
responds to critics who say: “You’ve politicized [the prosecutor’s office] by 
taking on these social issues,” by emphasizing that she “always” situates change 
“in the framework of safety.”93 Baltimore’s chief prosecutor, Marilyn Mosby, 
invoked the public outcry for justice to defend the controversial prosecution of 
police officers responsible for the death of Freddie Gray.94 Saint Louis 
Prosecutor Robert McCulloch invoked the same principle to defend the 
controversial decision not to prosecute the Ferguson police officer who killed 
Michael Brown.95 This is the allure of a justice benchmark. Freed of any specific 
guidance, prosecutors, along with their champions and detractors, can mix and 
match justice-based theories of prosecution to support almost any policy or 
action. 
The interchangeability of various, often inconsistent, justice-based 
prosecutorial approaches is not the only problem. There is also indeterminacy. 
Many of the above-referenced approaches (public safety, social justice, 
populism, fairness) provide only slightly more guidance with respect to specific 
prosecutorial decisions than the overarching “do justice” command itself. Yet, 
prosecutors must make hard decisions about real cases. For example, if the 
evidence to support a prosecution is close to the boundary, what guidance does 
it add to say that the prosecutor should seek “public safety” or “social justice”? 
Would the public safety prosecutor decrease the requisite evidentiary bar, and 
the social justice prosecutor increase it? Does it depend on the case, the victim, 
the defendant, and by how much? At best, concepts like “social justice” and 
“public safety” hint at the direction of a possible prosecutorial decision, but they 
give individual prosecutors (and their critics) little guidance about where to draw 
any particular line. 
None of this means that justice should be abandoned as the guiding 
prosecutorial principle. It may well be the best of a flawed set of alternatives. In 
the current climate, the freedom of action provided by the absence of a normative 
theory allows prosecutors to blunt the sharp edges of the system that brought us 
 
kim-foxx-wrongful-convictions-20171117-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZCK8-FGL3] (“As a 
prosecutor’s office, inasmuch as we fight for public safety, we also recognize that we have to right 
wrongs and be willing to do that.”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Ted Slowik, Foxx Understands Retailers’ Frustrations with Theft Policy; Flossmoor 
Resident’s Office is prosecuting fewer offenders but says her new approach is addressing the underlying 
causes of crime; Interview with Cook County State’s Attorney, DAILY SOUTHTOWN (Feb. 25, 2018), 
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/6ca4a773-e921-422d-b530-
4b44dabfd071/?context=1000516. 
 94. See Hylton, supra note 11. 
 95. Jeremy Kohler, Statement of St. Louis Prosecuting Attorney Robert P. McCulloch, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/statement-of-st-louis-prosecuting-attorney-robert-p-mcculloch/article_2becfef3-9b4b-5e1e-
9043-f586f389ef91.html [https://perma.cc/77KD-ETEB] (“It is my sworn duty and that of the grand 
jury to seek justice, and not simply obtain an indictment or conviction.”). 
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mass incarceration. But it is worth keeping in mind that mass incarceration arose 
under the “do justice” status quo.96 And the lack of a concrete normative 
principle hobbles efforts to control prosecutorial excesses of all kinds, including 
unnecessary severity. Granting prosecutors a roaming mandate to “do justice” 
comes at a cost. The question becomes: Is there a better alternative? 
II. 
AN ALTERNATE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTOR 
Justice as a job description works well for superheroes. When an evil villain 
attempts to destroy the world, justice provides a ready answer for whether to 
respond (yes!) and how (whatever it takes!). For the typical local prosecutor 
attempting to emerge from under a pile of paperwork, however, it is a nebulous 
command. The challenge, then, is identifying an alternative that would offer real 
guidance in the day-to-day tasks that occupy prosecutors. This Section sketches 
an alternative “servant-of-the-law” theory to govern those decisions—at least as 
a default framework for thinking about the prosecutor’s role. It begins with 
charging—often the first and most important decision that a prosecutor makes—
before moving to other aspects of the prosecutorial role like plea bargaining and 
case processing.97 Along the way, it highlights the inadequacy of “doing justice” 
as an answer to these questions. 
A. Assessing Evidentiary Sufficiency 
Any theory about prosecutorial behavior should begin with charging.98 
Charging at the state and local level typically has two components. First, a 
prosecutor must determine whether to accept a case initiated by the police. 
Second, the prosecutor must determine the precise charge (or charges). 
For many cases, the charge will be obvious (e.g., residential burglary) and 
the critical question will be whether there is sufficient evidence that (a) the crime 
occurred, and (b) the defendant, as opposed to some other person, is responsible. 
To consistently screen these cases, prosecutors must identify some quantum of 
evidence to serve as a prerequisite to prosecution. The law sets a low floor: 
probable cause.99 Absent probable cause to believe the defendant guilty of an 
offense, the prosecutor cannot legally maintain a charge.100 Ethics codes echo 
 
 96. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Difficulties of Democratic Mercy, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1679, 1697 
(2015) (“[T]he rise of prosecutorial discretion since the 1970s coincided with an unprecedented leap in 
the incarceration rate.”). 
 97. Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 301, 315 (2017) (“A prosecutor’s charging decision lies at the core of the prosecution 
function.”). 
 98. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION 72 (1993) (Standard 3-3.9 cmt.) (“The charging decision is the heart of the 
prosecutor function.”). The comment also states: “By its very nature, however, the exercise of discretion 
cannot be reduced to a formula.” Id.  
 99. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
 100. Id. 
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this standard.101 Unfortunately, beyond this minimal guidance, the “codes are 
deficient regarding the [requisite] degree of confidence and how it should be 
achieved.”102 
Those who take justice as the prosecutor’s benchmark struggle to find 
consensus as to how a prosecutor should assess the requisite proof of guilt ex 
ante.103 Among the commonly referenced possibilities are (1) deferring close 
cases to the jury,104 or (2) proceeding only in cases where the prosecutor 
personally believes the defendant to be guilty.105 Both choices are objectionable, 
although they fit comfortably under a justice umbrella. Most cases never get to 
trial, and most convictions result from guilty pleas.106 Consequently, if a 
prosecution is unwarranted, that decision cannot be deferred to a jury verdict that 
may never come. Similarly, relying on a prosecutor’s personal (and potentially 
idiosyncratic) belief in a particular defendant’s guilt or culpability is unappealing 
for obvious reasons. Instead, as discussed below, the prosecutor should be tasked 
with assessing a defendant’s substantive guilt in light of the evidence that would 
be introduced at trial—i.e., the result most consistent with the law. 
A servant-of-the-law approach to charging tracks Department of Justice 
(DOJ) guidance that instructs federal prosecutors to pursue “readily provable” 
cases, “cases that the government should win if there were a trial.”107 The DOJ 
explains: a charge is not “readily provable” if “the prosecutor has a good faith 
doubt . . . for legal or evidentiary reasons . . . as to the government’s ability 
 
 101. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 70–71 (Standard 3-3.9(a)); DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE MANUAL ¶ 9.27.200 cmt. (“[F]ailure to meet the minimal 
requirement of probable cause is an absolute bar to initiating a federal prosecution . . . .”). 
 102. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 337 
(2001). 
 103. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 42, at 50 (“The academic literature reflects vigorous 
disagreement about how convinced of guilt prosecutors should be before bringing or continuing 
charges.”). 
 104. See H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance 
from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1159 (1973); see also Maura Ewing, America’s Leading Reform-
Minded District Attorney Has Taken His Most Radical Step Yet, SLATE (Dec 4, 2018), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/12/philadelphia-district-attorney-larry-krasner-criminal-
justice-reform.html [https://perma.cc/K4NY-47T5] (reporting former Pennsylvania governor and 
Philadelphia District Attorney Ed Rendell’s disagreement with Krasner about charging homicides, with 
Rendell arguing “that juries and judges were best situated to determine the facts of a case that might lead 
to a heightened sentence”). 
 105. Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging 
Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 522 (1993); cf. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 71 (Standard 
3-3.9(c)) (“A prosecutor should not be compelled by his or her supervisor to prosecute a case in which 
he or she has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused.”). 
 106. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”). 
 107. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Thornburgh Bluesheet (1989): Plea Policy for Federal Prosecutors, 
6 FED. SENT’G. REP. 347, 348 (1994) [hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum]. With respect to the 
evidentiary threshold, the National District Attorneys Association’s standard states that “[a] prosecutor 
should file charges” that “she reasonably believes can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial.” 
NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, ¶ 4-2.2. 
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readily to prove a charge.”108 Note that these formulations subtly discount the 
prosecutor’s subjective assessment of the defendant’s guilt. They instead focus 
on the prosecutor’s professional assessment of a jury’s reaction (“should win”) 
to the expected evidence.109 “Should,” in this context, is best read to reflect a 
jury following the judicial instructions that describe its role. Although juries have 
the raw power to acquit for any reason, courts instruct juries that they “must” (or 
sometimes “should”) convict when the evidence proves the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.110 Juries in the post-Civil War South reflexively 
acquitted white “defendants who committed crimes against African-Americans 
and white Republicans,” yet the prosecution of such cases is easily defended.111 
In modern times, the government could properly maintain a strong case against 
a police officer even though it expected a police-friendly jury to acquit. Or the 
prosecutor could pursue a case against an alleged date rapist even if the 
prosecutor believed the jury would acquit based on disagreement with the law.112 
The same principle applies even when the prosecutor (as opposed to the jury) 
disagrees with the law’s application. For example, a servant-of-the-law 
prosecutor with philosophical objections to drug or gun possession laws would 
not dismiss a drug or gun case based on their personal opinion that the jury 
“should” not convict. 
Importantly, in making the charging decision, the servant-of-the-law 
prosecutor—interested only in whether the defendant should, legally speaking, 
be convicted—would be keenly attuned to detecting faulty prosecution evidence. 
This would include cases that depend on police officers with credibility 
problems, jailhouse informants, coerced confessions, flawed identification 
procedures, or questionable forensic science.113 Even if unsophisticated jurors 
might be swayed by such evidence, a servant-of-the-law prosecutor would 
decline to offer any evidence that a reasonable juror should reject. 
 
 108. Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 107. 
 109. The Crown Prosecution Service, responsible for charging in England and Wales, requires 
the prosecutor to find a “realistic prospect of conviction” which “means that an objective, impartial and 
reasonable jury or bench of magistrates or judge hearing a case alone, properly directed and acting in 
accordance with the law, is more likely than not to convict the defendant of the charge alleged.” The 
Code for Crown Prosecutors: The Evidential Stage, THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERV. §§ 4.6–4.7 (Oct. 
2018), https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/XD28-5G22].  
 110. Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 785 (1998) (noting that “[j]uries are routinely instructed” that they “must” or 
“should” convict defendants “whose guilt the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 111. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the United 
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 890 (1994) (chronicling the problem of “Southern jury nullification 
following the Civil War”). 
 112. But cf. Holly Yan, A Prosecutor Refused to Try an Ex-Frat Leader’s Sex Assault Case. Here 
are her Eye-Opening Reasons Why, CNN (Dec. 13, 2018) https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/12/us/baylor-
rape-allegation-letter-from-prosecutor/index.html [https://perma.cc/TU7G-EFC5] (recounting a 
prosecutor’s explanation for declining to pursue rape charge because “our jurors aren’t ready to blame 
rapists and not victims”). 
 113. See GARRETT, supra note 63; George & Hager, supra note 63. 
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Putting the above-described standards together reveals a concrete 
evidentiary charging standard: a prosecutor should only charge a case when the 
prosecutor expects that the evidence introduced at trial will prove the defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Importantly, this standard is not merely 
descriptive. It does not turn on a prediction of whether the jury will convict. 
Instead, it looks to whether, given the admissible evidence, the jury should 
(legally speaking) convict. In other words, the standard tracks the law. Servant-
of-the-law prosecutors would not select charges based on their subjective 
perception of guilt or justice, or to protect the public, or by deferring to the result 
the community prefers. Rather, these prosecutors would seek to obtain results 
that mirror the applicable laws.114 
B. Selecting a Charge 
Once the prosecutor is satisfied there is sufficient evidence of guilt to 
warrant prosecution, the next question is how stringently to charge. Even if the 
defendant’s guilt is clear, a prosecutor has the power to dismiss the case entirely, 
or to file more serious charges than the facts support. 
Application of the servant-of-the-law model is clearest with respect to 
charges with concrete elements and delineations. For example, Pennsylvania law 
creates six grades of theft that track “the market value of the property at the time 
and place of the crime.”115 The framework (simplified slightly) is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First-degree felony over $500,000 
Second-degree felony $100,000 to $500,000  
Third-degree felony $2000 to $100,000 
First-degree misdemeanor $200 to $2000 
Second-degree misdemeanor $50 to $200 
Third-degree misdemeanor up to $50 
 
Imagine that the defendant stole a two-year-old laptop computer left 
momentarily unattended at the library. The computer cost $2,500 new, but is 
 
 114. See, e.g., Ewing, supra note 104 (quoting Larry Krasner on charging: “We are going to 
proceed on charges that are supported by the facts in the case, period”). 
 115. Grading of Theft Offenses, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3903(c)(1) (2017). The statute also singles 
out certain property theft (e.g., theft of “anhydrous ammonia”) for special treatment regardless of value. 
Id. § 3903(a)(4). 
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likely worth significantly less on the resale market. If justice is the measuring 
stick, it is unclear how the prosecutor should proceed. Some prosecutors may 
seek justice by giving the defendant a break, while others may view justice as 
requiring the most serious plausible charge (a felony). The NDAA’s National 
Prosecution Standards illustrate the problem. The Standards direct prosecutors 
to “only file those charges that are consistent with the interests of justice.”116 To 
help prosecutors implement this command, the Standards enumerate seventeen 
factors that “may be considered” in determining whether to bring any charge, 
plus thirteen factors that “may be relevant” to selecting the precise charge.117 The 
Standards emphasize that prosecutors can still consider unenumerated factors.118 
Some of the listed factors (“other aggravating or mitigating circumstances”) 
actually broaden, rather than restrict, the calculus.119 That’s the “do justice” 
alternative. Justice sounds like a great standard, but it boils down to a broad 
license for prosecutors to do whatever they think is right. Apart from obvious 
consistency concerns, there is a legitimacy problem as well. When prosecutors 
manipulate charges in the interest of justice, they are effectively amending the 
laws enacted by the legislature. This may be unavoidable where the law itself 
provides amorphous and subjective benchmarks. But it is problematic where, as 
for many of the most commonly charged offenses, the statutory elements are 
clear.120 
A potentially preferable alternative directs the prosecutor to “serve the law” 
by charging the offense for which a jury should (legally speaking) convict—here, 
the first-degree misdemeanor given the current value of the computer. This 
standard echoes the discussion from the preceding section and provides both a 
charging floor and a ceiling. It prevents the prosecutor from giving the defendant 
a break by downgrading the offense, but it also limits the prosecutor’s ability to 
“overcharge.” 
The concept of overcharging, while ubiquitous in criticism of prosecutorial 
behavior, is difficult to define using a justice benchmark and so impossible to 
restrain.121 The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice illustrate the difficulty: 
The line separating overcharging from the sound exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion is necessarily a subjective one, but the key 
 
 116. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, ¶ 4-2.4. 
 117. Id. ¶ 4-1.3 (“Screening: Factors to Consider”), ¶ 4-2.4 (“Charging: Factors to Consider”). 
The Standards include another twenty factors, and eleven sub-factors, to consider in negotiating a plea 
agreement. Id. ¶ 5-3.1. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. ¶ 4-2.4. 
 120. See infra Part III.A (listing commonly prosecuted offenses). 
 121. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 1, at 31 (“Prosecutors routinely engage in overcharging, a 
practice that involves ‘tacking on’ additional charges that they know they cannot prove . . . or that they 
can technically prove but are inconsistent with the legislative intent or otherwise inappropriate.”); Kyle 
Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 702 (2014) (recognizing prevalence of the term, 
but noting that typically commentators “have failed to explain precisely what they mean by 
‘overcharging’”). 
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consideration is the prosecutor’s commitment to the interests of justice, 
fairly bringing those charges he or she believes are supported by the 
facts without “piling on” charges in order to unduly leverage an accused 
to forgo his or her right to trial.122 
Again we see the familiar role played by generic appeals to “the interest of 
justice,” and the centrality of vague qualifiers (“fairly,” “unduly”) and colloquial 
metaphors (“piling on”). A more serviceable definition of overcharging would 
be: charging the defendant with an offense or enhancement that is not “readily 
provable,” or an offense for which the jury should not convict.123 Here the ABA’s 
illustration resonates with one provided in the federal charging guidance 
referenced in Part II.A: “charges should not be filed simply to exert leverage to 
induce a plea.”124 This principle fits comfortably within the servant-of-the-law 
model. It also parallels the rhetoric of progressive prosecutors who seek to alter 
charging practices to eliminate overcharging. In a recent profile, a leading voice 
of the progressive prosecution movement, Philadelphia District Attorney Larry 
Krasner, embraced a charging philosophy that parallels the standard described 
above: “We are not going to overcharge. . . . We are not going to try to coerce 
defendants. We are going to proceed on charges that are supported by the facts 
in the case, period. The era of trying to get away with the highest charge 
regardless of the facts is over.”125 Interestingly, this notion of structured charging 
does not fit neatly under a broad appeal to justice. For example, could a 
prosecutor who is confident of the defendant’s guilt but seeks to spare a child-
victim the trauma of trial, “pile on” charges to coerce a plea? An appeal to “do 
justice,” “public safety,” “social justice,” or “popular will” provides no answer. 
Perhaps it is no coincidence, then, that the NDAA’s justice-focused National 
Prosecution Standards do not include any restriction on filing charges to obtain 
plea bargaining leverage.126 
The servant-of-the-law charging strategy described above requires 
additional nuance in scenarios where the law itself provides choices but little 
guidance. There are three iterations. First, the law may provide only amorphous 
and subjective guidance. For example, Virginia’s aggravated manslaughter 
statute applies when “the conduct of the defendant was so gross, wanton and 
 
 122. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 77 (Section 3-3.9 cmt.). 
 123. See Part II.A. Use of the term “readily” to modify “provable” suggests a limit on the effort 
that will be spent trying to establish currently unclear offenses. For an example of a prosecutor’s 
description of her office’s strained interpretation of this limit, see Stephanie M. Rose, Finding Humanity, 
30 FED. SENT’G REP. 186, 187 (2018). 
 124. John Ashcroft, Memo Regarding Policy on Charging of Criminal Defendants, DEP’T OF 
JUST. (Sept. 22, 2003), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm 
(echoing earlier guidance). 
 125. Ewing, supra note 114. 
 126. The only limit in the Standards, placed under the header “Improper Leveraging,” is that the 
prosecutor “should not file charges where the sole purpose is to obtain from the accused a release of 
potential civil claims.” NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, ¶ 4-2.3 
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culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life.”127 Second, a statute may 
provide choices without guidance, leaving the charge determination entirely up 
to the prosecutor. This is the case with California’s “wobbler” offenses—single 
offenses that can be charged as felonies or misdemeanors at the discretion of the 
prosecutor.128 Third, the law may provide a facially clear standard, but signal a 
desire that the prosecutor invoke the standard sparingly. Examples of this last 
iteration typically involve draconian enhancements to standard punishments 
tempered by an extra step beyond charging that the prosecutor can decline to 
exercise. 
The first iteration (crimes with inherently subjective elements) fits into the 
existing model. The servant-of-the-law prosecutor must make an objective 
determination as to whether the admissible evidence will establish proof of the 
ambiguous element (“gross, wanton and culpable”) beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The exercise will be more difficult than in the earlier Pennsylvania theft example, 
but it is the same exercise we ask of jurors and judges, and an unavoidable aspect 
of certain common law crimes. True, prosecutors will reach different conclusions 
across jurisdictions and over time. But here, the legislature knowingly invites 
inconsistency by defining a criminal offense by reference to ambiguous terms. 
A servant-of-the-law prosecutor will have to accept that inconsistency as part of 
the law. 
The second and third iterations described above are anathema to a servant-
of-the-law model. The servant-of-the-law prosecutor can and should reject 
discretionary choices devoid of legal guidance. The most effective way to do this 
would be to apply a prosecutorial discretion “rule of lenity” that defaults to the 
less severe option when the legislature tries to dictate a standardless choice. 
Typically applied by courts in the statutory construction context, the “rule of 
lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the 
defendants subjected to them.”129 Among other things, this pushes “Congress to 
speak more clearly.”130 It is a small leap to apply this same principle to 
prosecutorial discretion in a servant-of-the-law regime. Justice Antonin Scalia 
illustrated the thinking in a related context as follows: “[O]nly the legislature 
may define crimes and fix punishments. Congress cannot, through ambiguity, 
effectively leave that function to the courts—much less to the administrative 
bureaucracy.”131 
 
 127. VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-36.1(B) (2004). 
 128. See Davis v. Mun. Court, 757 P.2d 11 (Cal. 1988); Manduley v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). For an example, see CAL. PEN. CODE § 473(a) (setting forth penalty 
for forgery as “imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by imprisonment” of sixteen 
months, two years, or three years under CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170(h)). 
 129. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 354 (2014) (Scalia, J. writing separately on denial 
of writ of certiorari) (emphasis removed). 
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This default to leniency is also appropriate when a standard exists for a 
sentencing enhancement or other provision, but the legislature expresses a desire 
for prosecutors to decline to invoke the provision even when that standard is met. 
For example, federal law authorizes draconian sentences for repeat drug 
offenders, but in a separate statute neutralizes these enhancements unless the 
United States Attorney takes an affirmative step to authorize their imposition.132 
Prosecutors got the message. A recent United States Sentencing Commission 
study found that federal prosecutors triggered these enhancements in only 12.3 
percent of cases where they applied.133 This is an unsettling state of affairs. The 
law does not impose these life-changing enhancements on eligible offenders. It 
offers them to federal prosecutors to use as they wish. Declining to accept this 
offer is consistent with, and best serves, the law. Stated another way, when the 
legislature provides punishments without standards, there is no law to serve. 
Even with the caveats described above, commentators may object to 
making charging decisions by plugging provable facts into a statutory framework 
because of the perceived severity of that framework in many jurisdictions.134 For 
example, unlike the federal provision, California’s “three strikes” law signals a 
legislative intent for broad application.135 A California prosecutor serving the 
law would charge cases with qualifying “strikes,” placing the defendant at risk 
for the extreme sentences apparently sought by the legislature. This introduces 
the issue of prosecutorial nullification.136 A key limitation of a servant-of-the-
law approach is that it disfavors prosecutorial nullification. Justice, by contrast, 
embraces nullification when it is the right thing to do. The social justice 
prosecutor can nullify the law to correct perceived legislative and law 
enforcement inequity. The public safety prosecutor might use the same power to 
dismiss calls to prosecute police officers or vigilantes. The populist prosecutor 
can embrace nullification as an opportunity to channel the (local) popular will. 
The possibilities are endless. Thus, further discussion of prosecutorial 
 
 132. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (“No person . . . shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason 
of one or more prior convictions, unless . . . , the United States attorney files an information with the 
court . . . .”). 
 133. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, APPLICATION AND IMPACT OF 21 U.S.C § 851: 
ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR FEDERAL DRUG TRAFFICKING OFFENDERS 6 (2018), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2018/20180712_851-Mand-Min.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SNC-SFN6]. 
 134. See Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 51, 91 (2016) (highlighting criticism of “resulting harsh sentences”). 
 135. California law states, “[a]ny person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been 
convicted of a serious felony . . . shall receive” an enhanced sentence. CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(a)(1) 
(2019). See also id. § 667(b) (declaration of legislative intent); id. § 667(g) (“The prosecution shall plead 
and prove all known prior felony serious or violent convictions and shall not enter into any agreement 
to strike or seek the dismissal of any prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation . . . .”). On 
the other hand, the law also authorizes the prosecutor to “move to dismiss” a strike “in the furtherance 
of justice,” which could trigger the default to leniency discussed above. See id. § 667(f)(2). 
 136. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2011) 
(exploring “prosecutorial nullification as a distinct species of prosecutorial discretion that presents a set 
of intriguing, important, and complex questions”). 
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nullification must be postponed to Part IV. For now, it is enough to note that 
even if we accept the appeal of nullification, similar results can often be obtained 
through structured legal processes, such as drug courts or diversion programs. 
Here, we are concerned only with charging. From a servant-of-the-law 
perspective, our hypothetical laptop-stealing defendant could be charged with 
the offense that best fits the provable facts: first degree misdemeanor theft. (The 
servant-of-the-law prosecutor could not charge a more severe offense as a 
negotiating tactic or to try to coerce a plea.) From there, the case can proceed to 
adjudication or be steered into a diversion program where the prosecutor or judge 
would dismiss the charge and expunge any record subject to various conditions 
(e.g., restitution). Diversion programs are discussed further in Part III.B. 
It is also worth noting that the servant-of-the-law prosecutor must serve 
constitutional law that may complicate the application of the most draconian 
criminal statutes. For example, a servant-of-the-law prosecutor would avoid 
charging cases that prevent defendants from exercising their right to trial. This 
scenario arises in at least two ways: (1) when, in a congested court system, 
defendants are detained prior to trial and an inevitable plea deal will provide a 
more attractive alternative to a post-trial acquittal,137 and (2) when a mandatory 
sentencing provision magnifies the likely punishment to such a degree that even 
a reasonable innocent defendant would accept a guilty plea (for example, 
California’s “three strikes” law as applied to a relatively minor offense).138 In 
these scenarios, the prosecutor need not ignore this context in selecting a charge. 
And where the charge itself jeopardizes the defendant’s constitutional rights, a 
servant-of-the-law prosecutor would preference the Constitution over the robotic 
application of a criminal statute. 
C. Prioritization and Plea Bargaining 
Any principle governing prosecutorial behavior must account for resource 
constraints, particularly at the state level. Police will often present prosecutors 
with more readily provable cases than they can responsibly prosecute.139 Issa 
Kohler-Hausmann documented New York City misdemeanor prosecutors 
 
 137. Laura Sullivan, Inmates Who Can’t Make Bail Face Stark Options, NPR (Jan. 22, 2010), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122725819 [https://perma.cc/GYX7-Y6ZU]. 
 138. See Jeffrey Bellin, Waiting for Justice, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2018/02/a-new-way-mandatory-minimum-sentences-have-been-demonstrated-to-severely-
warp-justice.html [https://perma.cc/R9XB-G3LG]. Note that the Supreme Court has not yet recognized 
a Sixth Amendment constraint on plea bargaining. Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) 
(rejecting constitutional challenge to prosecutor’s use of draconian enhancement as plea bargaining 
leverage). But the Court has also not ruled it out, leaving prosecutors some freedom to fill in those 
contours. Id. (“[B]road though [the prosecutor’s] discretion may be, there are undoubtedly constitutional 
limits upon its exercise.”). 
 139. See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, § 5-4 cmt. (“There are few prosecutors 
who have the resources that would be required to try every case.”). 
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handling caseloads that “often number between 100 and 200.”140 The volume 
extends to more serious cases as well. Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger, 
reporting on astronomical state prosecutor caseloads across the country, 
highlighted Harris County, Texas (Houston), “where some prosecutors are 
handling upwards of 1500 felonies per year and over 500 felonies at any one 
time.”141 
In light of these caseload realities, many prosecutors need to dismiss some 
cases to competently handle the rest. This requires prioritization. Prosecutors 
“doing justice” have a free hand in deciding how to prioritize. A servant-of-the-
law prosecutor’s decisions would be guided by formal legal strictures. A 
prosecutor can prioritize cases the law considers most serious, using cues like 
sentencing ranges and legislative labels (misdemeanor, felony, first degree, 
second degree, etc.).142 One Virginia prosecutors’ office, for example, recently 
responded to caseload pressure by declining to handle misdemeanor cases at 
all.143 
The other prosecutorial prioritization tool is plea bargaining. Observers 
identify plea bargaining as the heart of prosecutorial power, given that 95 percent 
of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas.144 Complicating matters, there 
are two competing theoretical narratives of plea bargaining, labeled here the 
“Godfather paradigm” and the “shadow-of-trial paradigm.” A servant-of-the-law 
prosecutor would engage in plea bargaining under the latter, but not the former 
paradigm. 
In the “Godfather paradigm,”145 the prosecutor unilaterally controls plea 
bargaining and guides the process to a desired result. For disfavored defendants, 
the prosecutor inflates charges to a point where the defendant cannot risk trial. 
The defendant then reluctantly agrees to plead guilty to avoid an excessive trial 
penalty. Stingy discovery regimes keep defendants ignorant of their trial 
chances, and draconian sentencing laws push trial out of reach. For favored 
defendants, the process works in reverse. Prosecutors offer plea terms so lenient 
that the defendant would be foolish to refuse. These deals can be hammered out 
 
 140. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
611, 664 (2014). 
 141. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 271 (2011). 
 142. See infra Part II.D. 
 143. See Bowes, supra note 68. 
 144. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—And What Can Be 
Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2017) (“The plea bargain is the ultimate source of this 
ever-increasing prosecutorial power.”). 
 145. I draw this descriptive term from the movie The Godfather. For the clip of the famous “offer 
you can’t refuse,” see IsiKermesse, I’m Gonna Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse, YOUTUBE (Oct. 
18, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SeldwfOwuL8 [https://perma.cc/4N76-TSFM]. 
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without input from victims and police. And the parties can use charge and fact 
bargaining, and stipulated sentences to minimize judicial second-guessing.146 
The competing “shadow-of-trial paradigm” posits prosecutors as less like 
Mafiosos and more like bureaucrats. These prosecutors process more provable 
cases than they (or the courts) can try. This gives prosecutors an incentive to 
compromise with defendants (and their attorneys) in much the same way that 
civil parties reach settlements. The prosecutor and defense attorney assess the 
likely outcome of the case—in light of the assigned judge and local juries—and 
craft a resolution that discounts that outcome in exchange for the defendant’s 
waiver of the right to a trial. For the most frequent state cases (e.g., drugs, 
common law crimes, DUIs, domestic violence), such deals become standardized. 
Discovery practices, the defendant’s own knowledge, and counsel’s experience 
permit sufficient pre-plea case assessments. And the trial penalty, while still 
present, is modest enough that defendants can still exercise their trial right. 
The “Godfather paradigm” neatly suits prosecutors seeking justice. A 
prosecutor who equates justice with severe penal consequences can seek to 
maximize guilty pleas and sentencing severity by manipulating the charges. A 
prosecutor seeking social justice can steer sympathetic defendants to lenient 
outcomes by offering generous terms. To avoid legislative and judicial override, 
prosecutors can work with defense counsel to massage the charges and facts to 
reach their desired result. In essence, plea agreements provide a ready 
mechanism for parties to bargain around the law to achieve justice.147 
On the other hand, the “shadow-of-trial paradigm” neatly suits a servant-
of-the-law model of prosecution. The widespread settlement of civil cases is 
typically viewed as a means of enforcing, not undermining, the law.148 Similarly, 
plea bargains can be structured so that agreements track likely post-trial 
outcomes, even with standardized discounts. By adhering to the “shadow-of-trial 
paradigm,” prosecutors could engage in plea bargaining while adhering to their 
role as servants of the law.149 In fact, empirical evidence suggests that in most 
circumstances, repeat-player attorneys share an assessment of the likely trial 
 
 146. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative 
View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 213 (2006) (discussing various plea bargaining strategies including 
charge and fact bargaining). 
 147. Cf. Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, 42 CRIME & JUST. 141, 165–69 
(2013) (summarizing empirical studies that showed that some prosecutors adjusted their practices to 
avoid harsh mandatory penalties). 
 148. See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: 
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 696 (2006) 
(noting prevalence of civil settlements, “a generally accepted and widely encouraged practice”). 
 149. Shawn D. Bushway et al., An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial,” 
52 CRIMINOLOGY, 723, 741 (2014); cf. Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1071 (2019) (concluding from ethnographic research that federal prosecutors internalize such 
considerations in making case decisions). 
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outcome.150 A defendant with this guidance could rationally trade away a 
potential acquittal for prosecutorial concessions.151 The resulting plea bargaining 
in the “shadow of trial” would uphold, rather than undermine, the law.152 
Reliance on the “shadow-of-trial paradigm” does not unleash servant-of-
the-law prosecutors to pursue subjective conceptions of the “just” result. While 
servant-of-the-law prosecutors could dismiss a provable charge to obtain a guilty 
plea, they could not support a guilty plea to an offense for which there was no 
factual or legal basis. Thus, unlike a prosecutor “doing justice,” a servant-of-the-
law prosecutor could not bargain for so-called “fictional pleas.”153 Just as 
servant-of-the-law prosecutors cannot inflate charges for plea bargaining 
leverage, they cannot endorse guilty pleas to lesser offenses that never occurred. 
Servant-of-the-law prosecutors are limited to charging offenses supported by the 
provable facts,154 and this obligation continues through guilty plea proceedings. 
The servant-of-the-law prosecutor would also remain attentive to defense-
protective constitutional law during the plea bargaining process. The primary 
rule in play will be the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.155 
But, as noted in Part II.B, prosecutors must also be cognizant of the pressure 
certain plea offers place on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial. 
D. Prosecuting Cases 
The preceding discussion fleshes out the prosecutorial calculus with respect 
to the most important discretionary choices made by typical state and local 
prosecutors: charging and plea bargaining. This Section discusses other 
important procedural decisions. 
Here, we can revisit the iconic Berger decision to consult the most 
frequently cited guidance in this context.156 In Berger, the Supreme Court wrote 
 
 150. Bushway et al., supra note 149, at 741; Mona Lynch, Realigning Research: A Proposed 
(Partial) Agenda for Sociolegal Scholars, 25 FED. SENT’G. REP. 254, 255 (2013) (describing research 
that “revealed how routine criminal matters were resolved in reference to ‘going rates’ for different 
offenses”). 
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bargaining.”); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
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 152. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
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 153. See Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 855 (2019) (defining fictional pleas as 
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 154. See supra Part II.B. 
 155. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (“During plea negotiations defendants are 
‘entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.’”). 
 156. Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in Addressing Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 398 (2011) (“We are all familiar with the Supreme Court’s 
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that a prosecutor should “prosecute with earnestness and vigor”: “But, while he 
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his 
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”157 
The imagery of a prosecutor striking “blows,” whether hard or foul, hints at an 
underlying flaw. The ideal theory of the prosecutor’s role should not 
conceptualize the prosecutor as a physical combatant. The only thing Berger 
adds to this unhelpful metaphor is the directive that prosecutors refrain from 
“improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction.”158 This is just 
question begging. No one thinks that prosecutors should use “improper methods” 
to obtain “wrongful convictions.”159 The question is what makes a method 
“improper” and a conviction “wrongful”? 
Again, Berger generates a nice billboard. But the famous language does no 
work in filling out a theory of the prosecutor’s role. Similarly, Berger’s 
exhortation that prosecutors vigorously strive to obtain “just” convictions does 
little to answer procedural questions in particular cases. Justice rhetoric becomes 
particularly problematic to the degree it suggests that prosecutors can deviate 
from laws with which they disagree. It is one thing to say the prosecutor’s duty 
to justice overrides fealty to the law in the charging or plea bargaining context. 
It is quite another to cite justice as a trump of the prosecutor’s procedural 
obligations. Yet, it is a small step from invoking prosecutorial discretion to 
undermine a substantive law (e.g., marijuana possession or capital punishment) 
to doing so to undermine a procedural one (e.g., a requirement to provide pretrial 
discovery or notice to victims). 
The search for concrete guidance again leads to the principle that 
prosecutors must serve the law. As a servant of the law, the prosecutor’s role 
extends beyond proving a case while adhering to applicable legal strictures. The 
special supplemental obligation of this model is that prosecutors would work to 
help other actors fulfill their legal duties. Berger cautions prosecutors not to kick 
defense attorneys when they are down (“foul blows”). A servant of the law helps 
struggling defense attorneys up so they can perform their legally mandated 
roles.160 
A non-combative prosecutorial mindset, more than any formal prescription, 
may be the most valuable thing American legal systems can import from 
continental Europe. The contrast is striking in one recent study of German 
 
seventy-five-year-old admonition that ‘while [a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones.’”). 
 157. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Cf. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 18 (Standard 3-1.5 cmt.) (“In no event, however, 
should a prosecutor participate or assist in the commission of illegal activity whatever the direction he 
or she may have received from a supervisor.”). 
 160. Cf. Zacharias, supra note 26, at 49 (deriving from obligation to “do justice” that “prosecutors 
must ensure that the basic elements of the adversary system exist at trial”). 
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prosecutors—perhaps the closest real-world analogues to servant-of-the-law 
prosecutors. Based on interviews, Shawn Boyne reports: German prosecutors 
eschew “self-aggrandizing terms” and boasts of “individual achievements”; they 
do not make “grand pronouncements about keeping society safe or getting 
criminals off the streets.”161 “Unlike American prosecutors, German prosecutors 
do not describe themselves as white knights or avenging angels . . . . A German 
prosecutor does not ‘do battle’ in the courtroom, put the criminal ‘away,’ or 
triumph over evil.”162 
The idea of the prosecutor as a disinterested champion of the law contrasts 
with the traditional American conception of the prosecutor as a zealous partisan. 
For example, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards state that “[a] prosecutor is 
not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law . . . .”163 But why not? 
It is unclear what we gain by framing the criminal justice exercise as a game, 
with prosecutors rooting for a particular team. Theoretically, by mixing an 
adversarial prosecutor with equally adversarial defense attorneys, we get 
justice.164 But the playing field is hardly level.165 And there are reasons to think 
that ambiguity about the prosecutor’s role actually enhances their advantage. 
Prosecutors don’t have to signal when they are acting as advocate and when they 
are acting as a “minister of justice.” They can leverage this ambiguity with juries, 
judges, and the public as they see fit.166 
Servant-of-the-law prosecutors’ unique role comes into play not in the 
fairness of the blows they deliver to defendants, but rather in careful attention to 
preventing legal system failures. Thus, the discovery obligations that flow from 
the servant-of-the-law model are broader than those currently recognized under 
a “do justice” paradigm. A prosecutor seeking to serve the law will want the 
defense to have all the information that the prosecutor possesses, i.e., open-file 
 
 161. SHAWN MARIE BOYNE, THE GERMAN PROSECUTION SERVICE: GUARDIANS OF THE LAW? 
56 (2014). 
 162. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 163. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 36 (Standard 3-2.8 cmt.). 
 164. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (highlighting the critical role of the 
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REV. 762, 783 (2016) (critiquing prosecutors’ neutrality); Zacharias, supra note 26, at 59 (“Because she 
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1234 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 108:1203 
discovery.167 The substantive laws demand punishment only for persons who are 
factually guilty. Procedural laws assign attorneys to defendants to seek out and 
present exculpatory information, and demand neutral factfinders to weigh the 
evidence.168 The process dictated by the law only works when prosecutors 
promptly pass along all case-related information to the defense. After all, a 
prosecutor whose goal is to serve the law, not seek a conviction (or justice), has 
little incentive to withhold information even when the specific jurisdiction’s 
rules do not mandate disclosure. 
The servant-of-the-law prosecutor’s unique obligations extend beyond 
discovery. A defense attorney can celebrate when a judge dismisses a case 
because the prosecutor forgot to subpoena an important witness. A servant-of-
the-law prosecutor faced with an analogous defense failure should suggest a 
postponement, ensuring that the defendant receives “the effective assistance of 
counsel” demanded by the Constitution.169 The prosecutor would internalize the 
correct legal ruling when a trial judge fails to enforce the evidence rules or 
defense counsel provides constitutionally ineffective representation, even if 
doing so strengthens the likelihood of an acquittal. If a case depends on evidence 
seized unlawfully, the prosecutor would dismiss the case, rather than wait to see 
if the defense attorney and judge catch the constitutional violation. Although 
such a dismissal may or may not comport with justice, it serves the law. 
Another distinction will manifest at sentencing. Prosecutors on “a quest for 
justice”170 can rationalize almost any sentence recommendation. Thus, an article 
published in 2000 by the then-President of the National District Attorneys 
Association suggests that a prosecutor should normally effectuate the call to “do 
justice” by seeking “the most severe sentence allowed by law.”171 By contrast, 
Philadelphia’s new District Attorney directs his prosecutors “to seek justice for 
society as a whole” by asking for lower sentences that are sensitive to the 
financial costs of incarceration.172 Servant-of-the-law prosecutors would not 
seek specific sentences. (This was Department of Justice policy for many 
years.)173 They would instead address pertinent mitigating and aggravating 
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factors, and inform the court of applicable laws. As servants of the law, 
prosecutors would have no professional interest in a particular sentence, other 
than that the sentence fall within the legal parameters.  
A similar calculus applies to bail determinations. The law places pretrial 
release determinations in the hands of the judge.174 Just as the prosecutor should 
respect the determination of legislators as to what conduct is unlawful, the 
prosecutor would defer to the law’s selection of judges as the arbiter of pretrial 
release decisions and sentences. 
A professional identity as a servant of the law would follow prosecutors 
outside the courtroom. If conceived as “an independent administrator of 
justice,”175 the prosecutor can sensibly seek to influence legislative policy. Both 
the ABA176 and the National District Attorneys Association177 encourage 
prosecutors to try to influence lawmakers to forward the cause of justice. Rachel 
Barkow, who identifies prosecutors as “one of the most—if not the most—
powerful lobbying groups in criminal law,” makes a compelling case that 
prosecutors use this power “to lobby for harsher sentences because longer 
sentences make it easier for them to obtain convictions through plea 
bargaining.”178 Others call on prosecutors to push legislators to enact progressive 
reforms like eliminating harsh sentencing provisions and cash bail.179 By 
contrast, prosecutor lobbying does not fit under a servant-of-the-law model. 
Much like judges, servant-of-the-law prosecutors would adopt a professional 
norm of only presenting unsolicited views to the legislature on matters directly 
affecting their positions, such as office funding.180 The prosecutor who is serving 
the law would leave advocacy for changes to that law to others. 
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In sum, as a servant of the law, the prosecutor must give the law force even 
when other actors fail to do so and even when doing so leads to dismissals and 
acquittals. This prosecutor would be indifferent to winning a case, and zealous 
only in ensuring that the laws are followed and the adjudicatory process created 
by those laws functions properly. 
III. 
MOVING FROM DOING JUSTICE TO SERVING THE LAW 
The previous Section sketches a servant-of-the-law model of prosecutorial 
behavior as a potential alternative to “doing justice.” This Section discusses 
whether the alternative is desirable. For all its flaws, the justice model provides 
prosecutors with flexibility to do the right thing, as they perceive it. It may be 
better to preserve this flexibility than to limit prosecutorial discretion with more 
concrete guidance. To analyze the tradeoffs involved, this Section compares the 
servant-of-the-law model to the “do justice” status quo in various categories of 
decision-making: charging serious cases, dismissing minor cases, promoting 
adherence to innocence-protective procedural rules, and incentivizing other 
institutional actors to do justice. 
A. Charging Serious Cases 
With respect to charging and plea bargaining decisions in the most serious 
cases, the move from a “do justice” to a servant-of-the-law model may not be 
particularly disruptive. The servant-of-the-law model of charging set out in Part 
II may even track existing state and local prosecutorial practices. This is because 
charge selections at the state level are typically straightforward for the crimes 
that matter most. In 2014, for example, prison populations reflected the 
prioritization of common law offenses. In decreasing order of frequency, state 
prisoners had been sentenced for Murder (13%), Robbery (12.8%), Rape 
(12.4%), Aggravated/Simple Assault (10.2%), and Burglary (10.1%).181 Non-
possession drug offenses added another 12.2%.182 This short list of crimes 
accounts for 70.7% of state prisoners. The other crimes that add smaller 
percentages of prisoners, like Theft (3.6%), Fraud (2.3%), Weapons offenses 
(3.94%), DWI (2.1%), and Motor vehicle theft (.8%), follow a similar pattern.183 
At least with respect to cases that lead to incarceration, state prosecutors can 
engage in straightforward charging calculations—matching the provable facts to 
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easily recognized crimes. In this area, they may already act like servants of the 
law.184 To the extent prosecutors deviate from this calculus, it is just as likely 
that they are overcharging as undercharging.185 
Many readers will resist the notion that the vast majority of American 
prosecutors can or do exercise fairly routinized charging discretion. A central 
claim of one of the most-cited criminal justice articles of all time is that it is not 
legislators and judges, but “prosecutors, who are the criminal justice system’s 
real lawmakers.”186 This notion, famously associated with the iconic Bill Stuntz, 
guides modern academic discourse.187 Critically, though, when Stuntz turned his 
lens to state and local prosecutors, the narrative changed. Consistent with the 
above discussion, Stuntz described most serious crimes that come through state 
prosecutors’ doors as “politically mandatory” in that there is no choice but to 
prosecute.188 And recognizing the resource constraints on state (as opposed to 
federal) prosecutors, Stuntz suggested that “there are enough of these politically 
mandatory crimes to occupy all or nearly all of local prosecutors’ time and 
manpower.”189 
Stuntz’s description of state prosecutors suggests a servant-of-the-law 
model might be neither radical nor disruptive. He writes: “For the state law 
crimes that are punished most consistently—basically, FBI index crimes plus 
distribution of serious drugs—state criminal law functions as law. . . . 
[P]rosecutors prosecute these crimes systematically and aggressively, meaning 
that, at least roughly, the crimes are enforced as written.”190 Prominent scholars 
used to make similar points about the practical restrictions on the charging 
 
 184. See BRUCE FREDERICK & DON STEMEN, THE ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS 
OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING – TECHNICAL REPORT 60 (2012) 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240334.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R7P-LHJW] (reporting that 
“strength of the evidence” is the primary charging factor identified by prosecutors); cf. Stephen 
Markman, Substantive Limitations on the Criminal Law: Random Thoughts of a Judicial Conservative, 
in IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE 166 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009) (“There is little in the everyday work of 
the typical prosecutor in any one of Michigan’s 83 counties, with the possible exception of drug 
prosecutions, that would upset most libertarians.”). 
 185. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 186. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 
(2001). Westlaw reports that the article has been cited over 850 times. It has been cited in “secondary 
sources,” like law review articles, more often than the Supreme Court’s Berger decision. 
 187. See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U. L. REV. 577, 632 (2012) (recognizing 
“William Stuntz’s seminal article on overcriminalization, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law”); 
Bellin, supra note 2, at 173–74 n.9 (tracing Stuntz’s influence); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s 
New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1201 (2015) (explaining that “almost every scholar 
working in the area draws on Stuntz”). 
 188. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 82, at 600. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 605. 
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discretion of prosecutors outside the federal context,191 although these 
observations are often missing from modern accounts.192 
The potential overlap between state criminal law on the books and current 
prosecutorial enforcement practices is important. It suggests that a narrow 
servant-of-the-law role for prosecutors may be both theoretically attractive and 
a rough approximation of the status quo for serious offenses.193 That would mean 
that the primary benefits (if any) of offering prosecutors a broad license to “do 
justice” manifest during the prosecution of minor crimes. As discussed below, 
there may be other ways to replicate these desirable aspects of prosecutorial 
discretion without ceding so much amorphous discretion to prosecutors. 
B. Dismissing Minor Cases and Diversion 
While a servant-of-the-law model may track current charging practices for 
serious cases, it likely deviates from those practices—for many prosecutors—for 
less serious offenses. Due to societal ambivalence about the significance of 
crimes such as drug possession, shoplifting, and prostitution, a prosecutor “doing 
justice” can freely dismiss charges for those crimes, or craft ad hoc alternative 
frameworks for disposing of those cases without a conviction. A prosecutor 
serving the law would not enjoy the same freedom. 
This is the context where a servant-of-the-law model will meet the most 
resistance.194 Prosecutors’ offices increasingly embrace “diversion” programs 
that reroute typically low-level cases to informal resolutions. Even the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, which shy away from any controversy, 
unequivocally endorse diversion.195 (The ABA’s enthusiasm extends to 
endorsing the threat of prosecution as a means to push suspects “to enter the 
 
 191. Id. (“[P]olitically accountable local district attorneys must spend the bulk of their time 
enforcing a small number of serious crimes. Those crimes are defined nonstrategically. They must be 
enforced, roughly, as written.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 401, 428 (1958) (describing the exercise of discretion by local prosecutors as consisting “largely 
of making specifically professional, and inescapable, judgments”). 
 192. See Bellin, supra note 2 (chronicling academic overstatements of prosecutorial power). 
 193. Frederick & Stemen, supra note 184, at iii (reporting after empirical study of prosecutor 
decisions that “prosecutors often rely on a fairly limited array of legal and quasi-legal factors to make 
decisions”); John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America: A Historical and Comparative Account, in THE 
CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 3, 14 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-
Borakove eds., 2008) (“Most prosecutors remain case processors.”). 
 194. See Bowers, supra note 51, at 1658 (“[T]he need for equitable discretion tends to rise as 
crime severity falls.”); cf. Griffin & Yaroshefsky, supra note 97, at 321 (“[P]rosecutors should focus 
more attention on . . . diversion for certain cases that are prosecuted.”); Erica McWhorter & David 
LaBahn, Confronting the Elephants in the Courtroom Through Prosecutor Led Diversion Efforts, 79 
ALB. L. REV. 1221, 1244 (2016) (encouraging prosecutors to “take the lead” in transforming 
misdemeanor case processing through diversion programs). 
 195. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 98, at 69 (Standard 3-3.8(a)) (“The prosecutor should 
consider in appropriate cases the availability of noncriminal disposition, formal or informal, in deciding 
whether to press criminal charges which would otherwise be supported by probable cause . . . .”). 
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military service.”196) The NDAA’s National Prosecution Standards similarly 
endorse diversion programs if the prosecutor determines that “diversion of an 
offender to a treatment alternative best serves the interests of justice.”197 The 
Standards explain that diversion programs can “conserv[e] judicial resources for 
more serious cases,” and reduce offender recidivism “by providing community-
based rehabilitation.”198 
The servant-of-the-law model is not against diversion. But it eschews 
lawlessness. Thus, a servant-of-the-law model would require prosecutors to 
distinguish diversion programs created by legislatures (good) from those crafted 
on an ad hoc basis by prosecutors (bad).199 In rough outlines, (bad) prosecutor-
created diversion programs work as follows.200 The police present a case to the 
prosecutor. The prosecutor determines that the case is not worth prosecuting. But 
rather than dismiss the case, the prosecutor requires the arrestee to jump through 
a set of hoops.201 The hoops might include community service, drug treatment, 
or counseling.202 Or, the sole requirement may be that the defendant avoid re-
arrest for a set period of time.203 The prosecutor then postpones the case pending 
satisfaction of the requests.204 The programs are attractive to both prosecutors 
and defendants because successful compliance results in a closed case. The 
prosecutor conserves resources and the defendant avoids a conviction. 
The servant-of-the-law model counsels against prosecutor-controlled 
diversion programs. Once a prosecutor decides not to prosecute a case, this 
model demands that the criminal justice system release the defendant from its 
clutches. Whether the issue is lack of evidence, insufficient resources, or 
compliance with a de minimis dismissal statute,205 the proper prosecutorial 
 
 196. Id. at 70 (Standard 3-3.8 cmt.) (“Another technique of long standing is for prosecutors not 
to prosecute an offender who has agreed to enter the military service . . . .”). 
 197. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, ¶ 4-3.1. 
 198. Id. ¶ 4-3 cmt. 
 199. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 703–04 (4th ed. 2004) (under 
§ 13.6, contrasting diversion programs authorized by rules or statutes with “informal and often 
haphazard” prosecutorial diversion programs). 
 200. For examples, see City of Phx., Diversion Programs, 
https://www.phoenix.gov/law/prosecutor/diversion-programs [https://perma.cc/9PXL-JJKD] (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2020) (noting that eligibility depends on the facts of the case, and that a “prosecutor 
reviews all cases with diversion eligibility issues”); Third Judicial Dist. Attorney (New Mexico), Pre-
Prosecution and Diversion Program, http://donaanacountyda.com/pre-prosecution-and-diversion-
program/ [https://perma.cc/54CT-DAYD] (listing requirements for participation, including that subjects 
abide by any “reasonable conditions as deemed necessary by the District Attorney’s Pre-Prosecution 
Diversion Program”). For a comprehensive exploration of diversion programs, see Am. Bar Ass’n 
Comm’n on Effective Criminal Sanctions, Report to the House of Delegates on Alternatives to 
Incarceration and Conviction, 22 FED. SENT’G. REP. 62 (2009). 
 201. Andrew W. Lehren et al., The Prosecutor’s Deal, the Defendant’s Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/12/us/law-quiz-criminal-justice.html 
[https://perma.cc/BE3G-UQP4] (“Your eligibility will depend almost entirely on your prosecutor.”).  
 202. See supra notes 196–197 and accompanying text . 
 203. See Bellin, supra note 2, at 1. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See infra notes 217–218 and accompanying text. 
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response would be dismissal. Period. Although many defendants no doubt 
benefit from services they encounter through diversion programs, prosecutors 
should not be the gatekeepers to these forms of assistance. And while these 
programs are often viewed as hallmarks of progressive prosecution,206 there is 
no guarantee that they function in this manner. The coercive force of the criminal 
justice system powers diversion programs. A defendant who enters drug court, 
for example, may end up serving more jail time than a similarly situated 
defendant who rejects the program.207 This is particularly true if prosecutors 
divert weaker cases as a politically expedient alternative to dismissals.208 
Diversion is always an attractive option. So attractive, in fact, that it is likely that 
some nontrivial percentage of defendants working their way through diversion 
programs were not, and would never have been found, guilty.209 
The same concerns about unguided, justice-based discretion in other 
contexts resurface with diversion. Indeed, these concerns are not just theoretical. 
A 2016 New York Times report on 225 prosecution-run diversion programs in 37 
states found widespread abuses, including that “in many places, only people with 
money” can afford to participate.210 The article explained, “Prosecutors exert 
almost total control over diversion, deciding who deserves mercy and at what 
price . . . .”211 
The inconsistency between the servant-of-the-law prosecutor and 
prosecutor-driven diversion programs does not mean that the use of diversion 
must be reduced. There is no particular magic to prosecutor-controlled diversion 
programs. These programs’ only real selling point is that they are relatively 
cheap and easy to create. Ad hoc prosecutor-driven programs can be 
 
 206. See McWhorter & LaBahn, supra note 194, at 1244. 
 207. FEELEY, supra note 151, at 234 (reporting that the New Haven pretrial diversion program 
“increases rather than decreases the harshness of the criminal process”); Josh Bowers, Contraindicated 
Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 792 (2008) (explaining that studies of New York drug courts 
“found that the sentences for failing participants in New York City drug courts were typically two-to-
five times longer than the sentences for conventionally adjudicated defendants”). 
 208. Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug 
Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 58 (2001) (highlighting “the potential 
for prosecutors to use treatment court as a place to ‘dump’ weak cases” and noting the difficulties faced 
by defense attorneys in convincing clients to refuse a referral to drug court in such circumstances). 
 209. See id.; cf. Bowers, supra note 207, at 788 (“[W]hen drug courts imprison failing 
participants, they punish them not for their underlying crimes, but for their inability to get with the 
program.”). 
 210. Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the Price of a Second Chance, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us/crime-criminal-justice-reform-
diversion.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Z56V-HYDU]. 
 211. Id.; see also State v. Long Fox, 832 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Konenkamp, J., concurring) 
(highlighting “the void in our law governing deferred prosecutions” by stating “deferred prosecution 
agreements in South Dakota have no standards, no guidelines for eligibility, and no formalized 
procedures authorized by legislation. They operate informally and purely at prosecutorial discretion.”); 
Michael Gordon, Yes, Rich People Have a Better Chance of Getting Off in Court, Public Defender Says, 
THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Sept. 22, 2017), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-
government/article174707216.html [https://perma.cc/6HWL-H7H4] (reporting that offenders were 
required to pay restitution before entering diversion program). 
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reconstructed, more comprehensively, through legislative action. And unlike 
prosecutor-controlled programs, statutory diversion can come with 
appropriations that override financial barriers to participation, and grant other 
officials, such as judges, de facto gatekeeping power. For example, a District of 
Columbia law allows trial judges to defer proceedings against a person convicted 
of a narcotics offense for up to a year, and at the end of the period, dismiss the 
case without a conviction.212 The statute then provides for expungement of the 
official record.213 
Legislatures can enact more diversion programs and broaden programs 
already in existence.214 Servant-of-the-law prosecutors would play an active role 
in these statutory diversion programs. Their role would be to ensure that qualified 
defendants are funneled to diversion programs according to statutory entry 
criteria. To the extent statutes mandate prosecutorial approval as one of the 
criteria, prosecutors should simply approve all requests for entry so long as the 
defendant meets the other eligibility criteria.215 Police departments can also fill 
the void, diverting arrestees from the adjudicative process even earlier in the 
process.216 
Servant-of-the-law prosecutors could also sidestep diversion entirely and 
dismiss minor cases pursuant to de minimis dismissal statutes, already present in 
nineteen states.217 These statutes authorize the dismissal of the types of cases that 
typically wind up in diversion programs. As Anna Roberts explains, de minimis 
“statutes are not about the legal or factual merits of a prosecution, or about guilt 
or innocence, but are about a determination that while the case is permitted in 
criminal court, it should not be pursued.”218 In jurisdictions with de minimis 
statutes, servant-of-the-law prosecutors would regularly dismiss diversion-type 
cases—either pursuant to statutory direction or in anticipation of judicial 
dismissals—with no strings attached. 
 
 212. D.C. CODE § 48-904.01(e)(1-2) (2019); see also Pernell v. United States, 771 A.2d 992, 999 
(D.C. 2001) (Ruiz, J., dissenting) (“[This section’s] application bestows important benefits that go 
beyond the outcome of the immediate criminal proceeding and can have an impact on a person’s 
subsequent activities in school, employment, etc.”). Virginia courts have found inherent authority to 
create de facto diversion programs by postponing judgment and then, if certain conditions are met, 
dismissing them without ever entering a conviction. See Starrs v. Commonwealth, 752 S.E.2d 812, 819 
(Va. 2014). 
 213. D.C. CODE § 48-904.01(e)(1-2) (2019); see Margaret Colgate Love, Alternatives to 
Conviction: Deferred Adjudication as a Way of Avoiding Collateral Consequences, 22 FED. SENT’G. 
REP. 6, 7 (2009) (describing similar programs in other jurisdictions). 
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 215. See supra Part II.B (arguing for a prosecutorial discretion version of the rule of lenity when 
legislatures dictate choices without guidance). 
 216. See What is LEAD?, LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, https://www.leadbureau.org/about-
lead [https://perma.cc/3T5H-GX4J]. 
 217. Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2017). 
 218. Id. at 336 
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Finally, prosecutors of all stripes will decline to prosecute a subset of minor 
offenses to focus finite court and prosecutorial resources on the most serious 
crimes.219 
C. Promoting Adherence to the Rules and Protecting the Innocent 
The previous Sections address changes in charging practices that would 
follow from a transition to a “servant-of-the-law” model. This Section looks at 
whether retiring Berger’s age-old guidance sacrifices anything outside of the 
charging context. Two wide-ranging benefits of the “do justice” exhortation are 
its implicit directions that prosecutors: (1) respect legal rules, and (2) protect the 
innocent. As explained below, these benefits are only enhanced by a servant-of-
the-law model. 
Commentators sometimes invoke the prosecutor’s duty to “do justice” as if 
it were independent authority requiring prosecutors to follow legal rules.220 But 
the courts do not actually use the “do justice” command in this manner.221 They 
don’t need to. Prosecutors, like everyone else, must comply with the rules of 
evidence, trial procedure, and discovery.222 That is the way to understand Berger 
v. United States itself, where the prosecutor transgressed generally applicable 
rules of trial procedure.223 When prosecutors breach a rule, it is that rule, not 
their obligation to “do justice,” that provides a remedy. State prosecutors, for 
example, must turn over exculpatory evidence.224 But this is not because they 
have a duty to “do justice.” Instead, prosecutors must comply with the 
requirements of Brady v. Maryland because failure to do so results in “a violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”225 If anything, the 
“do justice” command undermines the clarity of the principle that prosecutors 
must follow the rules. For example, the NDAA’s National Prosecution Standards 
assert that there may be circumstances where “a prosecutor chooses to disregard 
a code or rule because of a belief that his or her duty to seek justice requires the 
same.”226 By contrast, asking prosecutors to conceptualize their roles as servants 
of the law strengthens the directive that they comply with the rules governing 
their own conduct. 
 
 219. See supra Part II.C. 
 220. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of 
Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 644 (2002) (noting the view that the Brady decision 
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 221. Id.; see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (“If the suppression of evidence 
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 222. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 738 N.E.2d 665, 672 (Ind. 2000) (discussing prosecutor’s 
obligation to follow local discovery rules). 
 223. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935) (“the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney 
. . . was pronounced and persistent . . . .”). 
 224. Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). 
 225. Id. 
 226. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, supra note 25, Commentary to § 1-1. 
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Another potential benefit of the “do justice” command is that it prompts 
prosecutors to care about a defendant’s potential innocence. While the content 
of justice is debated, one point of general agreement is that it is unjust to punish 
people for crimes they did not commit.227 Again, however, this same principle 
can be derived from a solemn focus on the law. The criminal laws dictate 
punishment only for those guilty of violating their terms. If, for example, the law 
provides a severe punishment for murder, it is inconsistent with that law to 
impose that penalty on someone who did not commit the offense. In addition, as 
already discussed in Part II.D, the servant-of-the-law model nudges prosecutors 
to effectuate procedural law, including many innocence-protective rules. Unlike 
the adversarial champion of justice, a servant-of-the-law prosecutor must 
facilitate the defense and judicial functions, enhancing judges and defense 
attorneys’ ability to protect the innocent. 
D. Pushing Other Institutions to Do Justice 
One of the clearest costs of the “do justice” model of the prosecutorial role 
is that it creates ambiguity about what prosecutors should be doing. This 
ambiguity obscures the capacity of other criminal justice actors to do justice—
and prevents voters and other observers from holding government officials 
accountable for perceived injustices. This Section discusses how the clarity of a 
servant-of-the-law theory of the prosecutorial role interacts with, and could 
improve, the actions of other criminal justice actors.228 
The most significant potential impact of reconceptualizing prosecutors as 
servants of the law would be on the legislature. With respect to setting forth the 
criminal law, the prosecutor acting as a servant of the law defers to the 
legislature.229 The prosecutor would not override the legislature’s determination 
of what conduct is unlawful, and how it should be punished. In his 
groundbreaking study of discretion, Kenneth Culp Davis makes this point in 
describing the role of the police: “When a legislative body enacts that an act is a 
crime, . . . police nonenforcement on the ground that the enactment is unwise 
seems clearly an unlawful assumption of power. When administrations flagrantly 
violate clear statutory provisions, they reject the central idea of the rule of 
law.”230 The usual response to Culp Davis is that mechanical application of law 
will often be too harsh and therefore unjust. A shift from a “do justice” to a 
 
 227. See Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be 
Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451 (1990) (“Negative retributivism, accepted by many or perhaps 
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 228. Hart, supra note 191, at 402 (“[E]ach agency of decision must take account always of its 
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 230. Culp Davis, supra note 55, at 87. 
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“servant-of-the-law” paradigm, however, does not mean that justice-related 
concerns would be banished from the criminal justice system. In fact, justice, 
broadly conceived, might be achieved more consistently as other criminal justice 
actors emerge from the prosecutor’s shadow. 
With the prosecutor’s role clarified, a more natural focus on the legislature 
and judiciary to do justice would emerge. A German law professor explaining 
how the German system of “compulsory prosecution”231 differs from the United 
States’ adversarial model makes these points: 
Citizens are protected against unjust convictions and oppressive 
punishments by the Penal Code rather than by individual prosecuting 
attorneys. . . . [T]here is general agreement in Germany that the Penal 
Code must be amended, rather than the polices of the prosecutor altered, 
if the administration of the criminal law produces undesired 
results. . . . German law relies on careful and elaborate judicial 
interpretation of the substantive law to solve problems that the United 
States often leaves to the discretion of the prosecutor.232 
The various marijuana legalization mechanisms spreading across the country are 
a modern American illustration of this dichotomy. In some jurisdictions, states 
decriminalize marijuana possession through popular referenda or legislative 
action.233 In other jurisdictions, prosecutors seek to achieve a roughly equivalent 
policy outcome through charging policies.234 Obviously, state-wide referenda 
and legislation are more comprehensive and enduring means to change drug 
policy. Prosecutor policies only apply within the prosecutor’s local jurisdiction, 
are non-binding, can change at any time, and do not prevent police from 
continuing to make arrests for drug offenses.235 In fact, prosecutors’ well-
intended efforts could, paradoxically, short circuit broader reforms by relieving 
political pressure in jurisdictions where opposition to drug laws is most acute.236 
A servant-of-the-law model will also bring out a greater case-sorting role 
for, or simply highlight the existing role of, the police. This is because even as 
 
 231. The rigidity of this constraint on German prosecutors historically, and over time, is a subject 
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the laws improve, lawmakers cannot anticipate every scenario. The “rule of law” 
necessarily involves discretion. No matter where power to enforce the law 
resides, it will incorporate a power not to act. That “negative power” is 
particularly ungovernable when delegated to numerous individuals like police 
officers or local prosecutors.237 
Yet just as there will always be discretion, that discretion will always be 
exercised in the first instance by the police. As Culp Davis recognized—and 
contrary to modern academic thought—it is local police, not prosecutors, who 
wield the greatest discretion in the American criminal justice system.238 Police 
(not prosecutors) conduct stings, make traffic stops, and respond to 911 calls. 
Prosecutors, by contrast, have little ability to detect crime. Thus, a speeding 
motorist can get off with a warning, a public drunk can be sent home in a cab, 
and a bellicose teenager can be lectured, not jailed. A group of co-workers in a 
college basketball “March Madness” pool need not be dragged into court to face 
gambling and tax evasion charges. Yet none of these mercies come about 
because we give broad discretion to prosecutors. These decisions are typically 
made by police.239 This is the case in Germany, perhaps the closest example of 
something like a servant-of-the-law model. While the German prosecutor 
possesses some discretionary power to decline to prosecute minor cases, this 
comes up infrequently: “In practice, the job of exercising discretion in these 
cases is performed by the police.”240 This means that in conceptualizing a role 
for prosecutors, we need not decide whether to create a discretionary screen 
between technical law violations and formal court action. The question is what 
we gain (and lose) by telling prosecutors to re-evaluate a question—is a 
particular infraction worth prosecuting?—already answered by local police. 
Even if police were not already making these decisions, they are the more 
logical official to take on the role. Local police are closer to the context of an 
offense, its role in society, and the likely impacts of legal intervention on the 
individuals involved. Unlike prosecutors, police come into regular contact with 
offenders, victims, and witnesses, developing a deeper sense of which cases and 
persons warrant formal intervention. This is particularly true for assessing a 
particular defendant’s culpability or remorse. The American adversarial system 
maintains an almost sacred separation between the prosecutor and a criminal 
defendant.241 Unlike a police officer, the prosecutor is “isolated from those—the 
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1246 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 108:1203 
defendant, his family and friends, and often, his witnesses—who might arouse 
the prosecutor’s empathy or stimulate concern for treating him fairly.”242 
Of course, any discretionary screening decision in the American criminal 
justice system raises concerns about racial bias and other pernicious factors.243 
But there is no reason to expect prosecutors to be preferable to police in this 
respect.244 In fact, with respect to important demographic factors, such as race, 
police departments are far more diverse than prosecutor offices.245 
Another reason to push discretionary, community-oriented determinations 
through a police filter is that the broadest justice-related screen should happen as 
early as possible. If legal intervention is not warranted, prosecutorial dismissals 
come too late. It is preferable that persons not be arrested than be arrested, jailed, 
and later have their case dismissed.246 Malcolm Feeley famously explained that 
for minor offenses, “the process itself becomes the punishment”; but that was an 
indictment of the system, not an endorsement.247 
None of this means that servant-of-the-law prosecutors must prosecute 
every case brought to them by the police. But it does narrow the prosecutor’s 
screening role. The most compelling reason to have the prosecutor re-screen a 
case selected for prosecution by police is that prosecutors, unlike police, are 
formally trained in the law. While a police officer might decide that an offense 
is worth pursuing from a community “protect and serve” standpoint, the 
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prosecutor could detect legal or evidentiary flaws in the case that preclude 
prosecution. Employing typical tools of statutory construction, including 
prioritizing legislative intent over text,248 declining to enforce impermissibly 
vague laws,249 and the rule of lenity,250 a prosecutor might determine that a case 
that technically fits a criminal statute should not be pursued. For example, the 
teenager who texts a picture of herself to a friend while handing him a marijuana 
joint could be charged with distributing both child pornography and drugs. The 
prosecutor’s decision to drop the charges would not constitute nullification, but 
application of the intent of the law over the literal text—a mainstream 
interpretive philosophy251—particularly in light of constitutional constraints.252 
One might object that this function overlaps too closely with what judges do. But 
there are good reasons to ask prosecutors to mirror judges under a servant-of-
the-law model. Perhaps the most compelling reason is that, in a system where 
cases are typically resolved prior to trial,253 a legal screen that would ideally be 
applied by judges must be delegated elsewhere. Finally, as already explained in 
Part III.B, many provable cases will be channeled to statutory diversion 
programs or dismissed entirely to allow prosecutors serving the law to focus 
finite resources on the most legally serious cases. 
IV. 
CAN PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTORS SERVE THE LAW? 
The previous Sections introduced the servant-of-the-law model of 
prosecution and analyzed the implications of moving toward that model and 
away from “doing justice.” This Section addresses the desirability of a servant-
of-the-law approach in the current criminal justice moment. Prosecutors 
constrained by the law may be attractive in the abstract, but a bolder theory of 
the prosecutorial role may be needed in a country with broad criminal laws and 
unprecedented incarceration levels. Why not employ every possible tool, 
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including raw prosecutorial power in the form of “progressive prosecution,” to 
counteract the criminal justice system’s severity?254 As this Section explains, 
there is little inherent tension between a servant-of-the-law model and 
progressive prosecution. In fact, this model could provide much-needed 
theoretical grounding for evolving perceptions of the ideal prosecutor. 
Progressive prosecution holds great appeal for reformers seeking to undo 
mass incarceration. A progressive prosecutor can dismiss cases to nullify unjust 
laws; counteract racial and socioeconomic imbalances in police enforcement or 
legislative drafting; defang the most severe punishments by declining to trigger 
them; and aggressively prosecute certain under-prosecuted crimes to promote 
broad policy goals.255 This progressive wish-list sounds like a challenge to a 
servant-of-the-law paradigm. In fact, the most concrete aspects of progressive 
prosecution fit well with a servant-of-the-law model. 
Again, we should begin with charging, the most important prosecutorial 
task. Discussions of progressive prosecution do not typically include a charging 
standard. But it is difficult to construct a progressive charging standard that 
would differ significantly from the proposal in Parts II.A and B. Prosecutors, 
progressive or otherwise, can discern the appropriate charge by matching the 
readily provable facts to statutorily defined offenses. Importantly, the proposed 
charging standard captures the progressive intuition that prosecutors should not 
charge a more severe offense to obtain plea bargaining leverage. Progressive 
icon Larry Krasner’s recent explanation of the charging practices in his office 
mirror this standard: “We are going to proceed on charges that are supported by 
the facts in the case, period. The era of trying to get away with the highest charge 
regardless of the facts is over.”256 Another authority in the progressive 
prosecution movement provides similar guidance: “Don’t make a plea offer if 
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you can’t prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”257 These sentiments fit 
neatly with a servant-of-the-law, not a “do justice,” model.258 In addition, as 
explained in Part II.B, progressive prosecutors could embrace the latitude the 
servant-of-the-law theory offers by defaulting to the less severe alternative 
whenever legislators provide choices without guidance.259 
The most likely point of contention between servants of the law and 
progressive prosecutors will arise when the latter reject certain disfavored laws. 
But there is a critical difference between viewing certain charges through a more 
skeptical lens and rejecting them out of hand. For example, Rachael Rollins, the 
newly elected District Attorney of Suffolk County (Boston), generated buzz 
among progressives with her “plan to forgo prosecution of 15 offenses, ranging 
from trespassing to drug possession with intent to distribute.”260 Similar 
sentiments appear throughout the progressive prosecution movement.261 But 
typically, progressive guidance does not reject offenses outright. As Rollins 
herself emphasizes, her “list ‘is not a blanket commitment.’” Instead, Rollins’s 
actual proposal is that prosecutions for certain less serious offenses require 
supervisory approval262—something that is required for any charge in many 
jurisdictions where supervisors screen all initial charging decisions.263 Rollins 
herself stresses that her do-not-prosecute list is not radical: “It’s about 
memorializing what is already happening in the majority of cases.”264 
General guidance to avoid prosecutions of minor offenses fits into a 
tradition of American prosecutors responding to resource constraints by 
declining cases presented to them by police.265 Minor crimes that are extremely 
common, like drug possession, trespassing, and loitering, provide the most 
obvious opportunity for prosecutors to conserve resources. Limiting prosecution 
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of these crimes also fits neatly into a servant-of-the-law paradigm. These 
offenses are among the least severely punished by legislatures and judges and 
yet, due to their volume, have the potential to clog court dockets. Prosecutors 
faced with inevitable resource constraints serve the law by declining to prosecute 
these offenses, enabling a tighter focus on more significant offenses. Progressive 
prosecutors may dismiss more minor offenses than non-progressive prosecutors, 
but apart from the rhetoric surrounding those decisions, the distinction is one of 
degree rather than kind. 
Other attributes of the servant-of-the-law framework fit even more squarely 
within the progressive prosecution movement. Providing broad discovery to 
criminal defendants,266 applying the law to crimes committed by police 
officers,267 dismissing cases that rely on thin or questionable evidence,268 and 
taking claims of innocence seriously269 all fit neatly into a servant-of-the-law 
paradigm. 
Anchoring the evolving ideal of the prosecutorial role in a theoretical 
framework provides a variety of benefits. By embracing a servant-of-the-law 
model, progressive prosecutors could ground their reforms in a rule-of-law 
paradigm that will appeal across the political spectrum, including to line 
prosecutors, police, and legislators. At a more general level, there are benefits to 
tying prosecutors, including those leading the progressive prosecution 
movement, to an overarching theory of prosecution. A rubric that places some 
theoretical parameters on prosecutorial freedom resists the inexorable extension 
of “the prosecutor’s empire.”270 For decades, reformers railed against the evils 
of unbounded prosecutorial discretion.271 In one of the more influential 
treatments, Angela Davis contended that “everyday, legal exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion is largely responsible for the tremendous injustices in 
our criminal justice system.”272 The compelling concerns about prosecutorial 
discretion expressed in longstanding academic critiques do not vanish when the 
discretion is (occasionally) used in a favored direction.273 To the contrary, the 
absence of a normative theory of the prosecutorial role enhances the dangers of 
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expanding prosecutorial power. There are over twenty-five thousand prosecutors 
spread across the country.274 A growing, but ill-defined sense that prosecutors 
not only can, but should, bend the laws to further individual conceptions of 
justice will not be limited to certain prosecutors.275 It will benefit unreasonable 
prosecutors, corrupt prosecutors, benevolent prosecutors, and everyone in 
between.  
Relatedly, voters might heed the call to pay more attention to prosecutorial 
discretion, but do so to endorse severity rather than lenience. Even in a time of 
enhanced attention to mass incarceration, populist reactions often favor 
increased severity.276 Prosecutors finely attuned to community sentiment and, 
more precisely, electoral approval may prove disastrous for vulnerable 
defendants and victims.277 The emerging wave of progressive prosecutors, then, 
generates an opportunity for crafting a theory of prosecution, while 
simultaneously highlighting the urgent need for some theoretical foundation in 
which to ground the prosecutorial role. 
By tying reforms to a servant-of-the-law paradigm, reform prosecutors also 
limit the prospect of backlash.278 A servant-of-the-law orientation folds 
prosecutors into the underlying mission of the criminal justice system, rather 
than asking them to override the actions of other powerful actors—even if the 
ultimate outcome remains the same. One explanation for legislatures’ general 
indulgence of prosecutorial power over the years is that prosecutors have acted 
in ways that legislators endorse. If that changes, legislatures may respond. This 
is a common pattern in other areas, such as gun regulation, where “pro-gun” state 
legislatures jumped to override “pro-gun-control” localities that strayed from 
state-wide policy preferences.279 Another example comes from the not-too-
distant past. Just as legislatures sought to rein in lenient judges through 
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sentencing guidelines,280 legislatures could enact charging or plea bargaining 
requirements to respond to prosecutors who appear to be flouting the laws,281 or 
just ratchet up severity more generally.282 Or legislators might empower other 
actors, such as police or victims, to initiate and prosecute cases themselves.283 
In summary, there are reasons to be wary of enhancing the prosecutor’s 
freedom to “do justice” as an answer to the system’s failings; that freedom may 
be part of the problem. An alternative path to reforming prosecutorial excess can 
achieve many of the goals of the current reform movement, while stressing 
adherence to the law. A prosecutor zealously serving the law will be less likely 
to bend or break existing legal rules by overcharging,284 relying on coercive plea 
bargains,285 failing to provide discovery,286 improperly striking jurors,287 
maintaining faulty cases,288 engaging in deceptive closing argument,289 and so 
on. This model would also support broader cooperation with defense attorneys, 
such as open-file discovery, and more transparent plea bargaining and charging 
practices. That cooperation would facilitate the innocence-protective roles of 
defense attorneys, judges, and juries. Finally, by clarifying lines of 
accountability, the servant-of-the-law model will shift the reform focus to other 
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actors with more mature capacities to enact lasting changes, like legislators, 
judges, and police. 
CONCLUSION 
While there is abundant criticism of prosecutors, there is no coherent 
normative theory of the role prosecutors should play in our criminal justice 
system. We tell prosecutors to “do justice” and hope for the best. The resulting 
dissatisfaction with prosecutorial behavior should come as no surprise. 
A meaningful theory of how prosecutors should behave is particularly 
important at a moment when the country has finally woken up to mass 
incarceration.290 With millions under correctional supervision, dropping crime 
rates, and a bipartisan desire for change, we stand at the precipice of true criminal 
justice reform.291 Many academics and activists look to prosecutors as drivers of 
that reform. Indeed, some of the harshest critics of prosecutors’ vast discretion 
seek to repurpose prosecutorial power to revolutionize American justice.292 But 
in a nation populated by thousands of prosecutors with widely divergent 
viewpoints, unbounded prosecutorial discretion to “do justice” will always be a 
many-edged sword. And as this Article explains, we need not turn over the keys 
to the justice system to prosecutors to achieve reform. Instead, there are clear 
benefits to reorienting prosecutors as non-adversarial, servants of the law. By 
cooperating with other criminal justice actors—particularly defense counsel—to 
enforce defendant-protective rules, prosecutors could help those actors fulfill 
their roles in combating injustice. And prosecutors could still dismiss cases and 
avoid mindless severity in service of the law. Finally, narrowing the role of the 
prosecutor under a servant-of-the-law model could redirect the focus of reform 
toward other actors in the criminal justice system, and the system as a whole, to 
ensure “that justice shall be done.”293 
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